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1 Introduction 
Many important economic decisions incorporate risk or uncertainty which does not arise from 
nature in the form of a natural disaster or a health risk, but from the action of another human 
being. To describe risk and uncertainty caused by human beings rather than by nature, Bohnet, 
Greig, Herrmann, and Zeckhauser (2008) refer to the term “social risk”.1 Social risk is especially 
ubiquitous in strategic situations, where one’s outcome does not only depend on one’s own 
action but on the action of another person. For example, one might think of bank clients whose 
wealth depends on the investment strategies of their bank managers, entrepreneurs whose 
profits depend on whether their customers appreciate and purchase their products, or employ-
ees whose future salary depends on whether their supervisors will recommend them for promo-
tion. 
According to standard economic theory, social risk arises from the existence of multiple 
equilibria in pure strategies (Aydogan, 2015). In a pure strategy equilibrium, each player 
chooses one of the available strategies with certainty, and any unilaterally deviating from an 
equilibrium strategy would lower her or his utility. If there are multiple pure strategy equilibria, 
the solution of the game is a priori ambiguous: Players are faced with social risk, because it is 
uncertain which equilibrium strategy the other players will choose. By implication, social risk 
 
1 Rigorously speaking, the terms “risk” and “uncertainty” have a slightly different meaning. Decisions 
can be defined as risky if decision makers do not know the actual outcome of their decisions but do 
know the probability distributions of the possible outcomes. Uncertainty implies that both the actual 
outcomes of the decisions and the probability distributions of the possible outcomes are a priori 
unknown. However, the literature on social risk taking does not clearly distinguish between risk and 
uncertainty (see, e.g., Ben-Ner & Putterman, 2001; Bohnet & Zeckhauser, 2004; Coleman, 1990). In 
line with the literature, I will also speak of “risk” even where there is “uncertainty”, as long as I do 
not deem a more rigorous distinction to be relevant. 
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does not occur in games with a unique pure strategy equilibrium. In this case, the equilibrium 
perfectly determines the moves of all players and thus the outcome of the game. Social risk 
caused by multiple pure strategy equilibria can be denoted as strategic risk. In response to 
strategic risk, players may apply so-called mixed strategies, i.e. they select each of the pure 
equilibrium strategies with a certain probability. A common example for such a randomization 
is the hand game “rock, paper, scissors”. 
Another source of social risk is imperfect information: Decision makers who are not fully 
aware of their counterparts’ preferences may have difficulty predicting the behavior of the 
latter correctly. Standard economic theory does not allow for this type of social risk, since it 
assumes that “all people are exclusively motivated by their material self-interest” (Fehr & 
Schmidt, 2000). This basic assumption of standard economic theory has been widely challenged 
in the last decades. Countless studies in the field of economics and psychology have pointed 
out the relevance of social preferences such as altruism or inequality aversion, which basically 
imply that individuals are not strictly selfish but willing to sacrifice their own payoff to increase 
the payoff of others (see, e.g., Kagel & Roth, 2009 for an overview). As social preferences may 
differ significantly between individuals, e.g. depending on gender (e.g. Croson & Gneezy, 2009) 
or on culture (e.g. Buchan, Johnson, & Croson, 2006), their existence gives rise to social risk 
in any strategic situation, even where there is a unique pure strategy equilibrium. 
Recent experimental studies emphasize the need for a better understanding of social risk 
taking and the underlying behavioral mechanisms. In fact, individuals treat social risk and 
natural risk differently (Bohnet & Zeckhauser, 2004). This is perhaps the reason why social 
risk taking behavior cannot be fully explained by attitudes toward conventional risk (see Tra-
utmann & Vieider, 2012 for an overview). The present thesis studies social risk taking in two 
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specific situations: a two-player market entry game (Kahneman, 1988; Selten & Güth, 1982) 
and a binary-choice trust game (Bohnet & Zeckhauser, 2004). The main characteristics of both 
games are summarized in Table 1. As will be outlined in more detail, there are some general 
differences. However, both games constitute a similar decision problem, because players have 
to choose between a safe and a risky option. 
 Number of Players 
Strategies 
per Player 
Pure Strategy 
Equilibria 
Is Game Played 
Sequentially? 
Two-Player Mar-
ket Entry Game 2 2 2 no 
Binary-Choice 
Trust Game 2 2 1 yes 
Table 1: Characteristics of the games studied 
The two-player market entry game can be framed as an entrepreneurial decision problem, 
where two firms have to decide simultaneously whether to enter a market or not. Since the 
market capacity is limited, e.g. due to constraints on the demand side, a market entry is 
successful if and only if the entrant firm is the only one in the market. The unique market 
entrant benefits from operating the market, whereas the non-entrant neither earns nor loses 
money. Simultaneous market entries cause financial harm to both firms. Thus, staying out of 
the market is the safe option, yielding neither a gain nor a loss, whereas a market entry bears 
the risk of being competed against and losing money. The payoff matrix of the game, including 
the payoffs used throughout this thesis, is given in Table 2. A unique market entrant earns 3.5 
experimental currency units (ECUs). If both firms enter the market simultaneously, both lose 
3.5 ECUs. Staying out of the market yields zero ECUs, irrespective of the other firm’s choice. 
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  Firm B  
  Stay Out Enter  
Firm A 
Stay Out (0, 0) (0, 3.5)  
Enter (3.5, 0) (-3.5, -3.5)  
Table 2: Two-player market entry game 
Formally, the two-player market entry game has two pure strategy equilibria, where each 
player chooses to enter the market if the other player chooses to stay out, and vice versa. Due 
to strategic risk caused by multiple pure strategy equilibria, there is also a mixed strategy 
equilibrium, where each option is chosen with a probability of 1/2. Thus, social risk arises from 
the existence of both multiple pure strategy equilibria and social preferences. 
Whereas the two-player market entry game is a simultaneous game, the binary-choice 
trust game is played sequentially. Its payoff matrix, showing the payoffs used throughout this 
thesis, is given in Table 3. The first mover (trustor) has to choose between the “trust” option 
and the “no trust” option. If the “no trust” option is chosen, both players receive an equal 
amount with certainty (10 ECUs). In this case, the role of the second player (trustee) is limited 
to the mere reception of money. However, if the “trust” option is chosen, the players’ payoffs 
are determined by the trustee’s choice. Speaking in terms of trust, the trustee can either betray 
or reward the trustor’s trust. Reward generates 15 ECUs for both players, whereas betrayal 
yields 22 ECUs for the trustee and 8 ECUs for the trustor. Thus, the trustor is faced with the 
decision problem of whether to choose the safe “no trust” option, yielding 10 ECUs with cer-
tainty, or the risky “trust” option, where she or he earns either a higher (15 ECUs) or a lower 
amount (8 ECUs) compared to the safe “no trust” option. Irrespective of the trustee’s choice, 
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the “trust” option yields a higher total payoff (30 ECUs) than the “no trust” option does 
(20 ECUs). From the “social” perspective, it is therefore beneficial to trust. 
  Trustee  
  Reward Betray  
Trustor 
Trust (15, 15) (8, 22)  
No Trust (10, 10) (10, 10)  
Table 3: Binary-choice trust game 
Under standard assumptions, there is a unique equilibrium in pure strategies, which can 
be derived by means of backward induction. Rational and selfish trustees should not choose to 
reward trust. By implication, trustors who perfectly anticipate their trust being betrayed 
should not even select the “trust” option. Since a unique pure strategy equilibrium exists, there 
is no strategic risk from the perspective of standard economic theory. Hence, social risk can 
only arise if social preferences are assumed. 
Throughout this thesis, I address three general research questions (RQs). First, I study 
how decision makers form expectations about their counterpart’s behavior in the two-player 
market entry game as well as in the binary-choice trust game (RQ #1). Depending on the 
context, expectations refer either to the predicted behavior of the other (“How will my coun-
terpart behave?”) or to perceived obligations of the other (“How should my counterpart be-
have?”). Second, I investigate how expectations and preferences are mapped into decisions 
(RQ #2). Third, I examine the interdependencies between expectations and preferences and 
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their joint influence on decisions (RQ #3). Figure 1 embeds the logical interdependencies be-
tween the three RQs in a general framework, which is refined step by step in this thesis. The 
numbers depicted in Figure 1 refer to the respective RQs. 
Figure 1: Interdependencies between research questions 
The present thesis comprises four essays, which are formally independent of each other. 
The numeration of the essays takes into account the respective game on which the respective 
essay is based: Whereas Essay #1 examines the two-player market entry game, Essays #2.1, 
#2.2, and #2.3 build on the binary-choice trust game. Although each essay focuses on a specific 
aspect of social risk taking, using two different games, they largely overlap with respect to the 
general framework developed above. In the following, I briefly review the four essays and indi-
cate to which of the RQs they refer: 
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− Essay #1, which is entitled “The Twofold Beauty Premium: Preference-Based and Be-
liefs-Based Behavior in an Anti-Coordination Game”, reveals three results.2 First, indi-
viduals taking part in a two-player market entry game form beliefs about their opponents’ 
behavior based on stereotypes (RQ #1), which relate people’s physical appearance to 
their willingness to take social risk. Second, people seem to refrain from market entry 
because they have a preference for good-looking counterparts. Both beliefs-based and 
preference-based behavior is moderated by people’s gender (RQ #3). 
− Analogously to Essay #1, the implications of Essay #2.1, entitled “The Higher Your 
Expectations, the Lower Your Trust: Avoiding the Experience of Unfulfilled Expecta-
tions”, are threefold.3 Studying a binary-choice trust game, my co-authors and I find 
evidence for a consensus effect, which generally implies that people tend to extrapolate 
from their preferences to the believed preferences of others (Mullen et al., 1985; Ross, 
Greene, & House, 1977). In line with this concept, trustors form beliefs about trustees’ 
behavior based on their own social preferences (RQ #1). Moreover, trustors who are 
optimistic with respect to their counterparts’ trustworthiness lower their willingness to 
trust in order to avoid their optimistic expectations being disconfirmed (RQ #2). 
− In Essay #2.2, which is entitled “Breaking the Rules: Anticipation of Norm Violation in 
a Binary-Choice Trust Game”, my two co-authors and I investigate the role of moral 
 
2 Essay #1 has been presented at the 2015 “Academic Summer” conference held by the Management 
Academy of the German Savings Banks Association (DSGV) in Bonn as well as at the 2015 annual 
meeting of the German Association for Experimental Economic Research (GfeW) in Hamburg. 
3 Essay #2.1 has been presented at the 2016 annual meeting of the German Association of Experi-
mental Economic Research (GfeW) in Gießen. 
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expectations in a binary-choice game (RQ #2).4 More precisely, we consider the obliga-
tions which trustors assign to the trustee role. Our study reveals that trustors who con-
sider trustees to be obligated to act trustworthily are, ceteris paribus, less willing to 
trust. The underlying reason may be that trustors attempt to hinder trustees from vio-
lating their moral obligation to reward trust. 
− In Essay #2.3, entitled “Once Bitten, Twice Shy: Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Hot-
Cold Empathy Gap”, my co-author and I study a repeated binary-choice trust game in 
which players take the trustor role and then take the trustee role, and vice versa. We 
find that people’s beliefs about others’ trustworthiness (i.e. whether others will reward 
or betray trust) moderate the intrapersonal correlation between trust and trustworthiness 
(RQs #2, #3). If subjects hold optimistic beliefs, their willingness to trust is positively 
related to their willingness to reward. We find a contrary relationship for pessimistic 
subjects. 
The remainder of the present thesis is structured as follows. Section 2 is dedicated to placing 
the two-player market entry game and the binary-choice trust game in a broader game-theo-
retical context. The binary-choice trust game is part of the trust game family, whereas the 
two-player market entry game constitutes a so-called anti-coordination game. Both classes of 
games are briefly introduced in Section 2. In Section 3, the role of social preferences is discussed 
with respect to the two-player market entry game and the binary-choice trust game. Section 4 
provides an integrated view of the essays, which are included in Section 5. 
 
4 Essay #2.2 has been published in Economics Letters (Breuer, Helduser, & Schade, 2016). 
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The essays are all similarly structured. First, the research question and its relevance are 
outlined. Second, hypotheses are derived from the related literature. The third step provides 
insights into the methods used. As all essays are experimental studies, this section especially 
features the experimental design and the procedures of the respective experiments. Next, the 
results obtained from the experiments are presented and discussed with respect to the hypoth-
eses. The results section is followed by a conclusion, covering theoretical and practical impli-
cations as well as open research questions. 
2 Social Risk in Two Classes of Games 
2.1 Anti-Coordination Games 
The two-player market entry game studied in Essay #1 belongs to the class of anti-coordina-
tion games. Formally, anti-coordination problems refer to situations where it is mutually ben-
eficial for players to choose opposite strategies. The difficulty to coordinate one’s actions arises 
from the existence of multiple pure strategy equilibria. As a rational player cannot anticipate 
for which of the equilibria the other player will opt, it is difficult to choose the optimal response 
to the other player’s choice. The two-player market entry game has two equilibria in pure 
strategies: Firm A enters the market if Firm B stays out, and vice versa. In neither of the two 
equilibria does any player have an incentive to choose a deviating strategy. The existence of 
two pure strategy equilibria results in an additional equilibrium in mixed strategies, implying 
that players will choose either of the two strategies at hand with a probability of 1/2 (given 
the specific payoffs shown in Table 2). 
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In the context of multiple pure strategy equilibria games, the role of risk attitudes has 
been studied with respect to coordination games only. In contrast to anti-coordination games, 
the pure strategy equilibria of coordination games imply that players choose the same or cor-
responding strategies. Heinemann, Nagel, and Ockenfels (2009) and Büyükboyacı (2014) inves-
tigate risk taking in coordination games and do not find a significant correlation between risk 
attitudes and coordination behavior. The stag-hunt game studied by Büyükboyacı (2014) is 
structurally similar to the two-player market entry game, because it also involves a safe and a 
risky option. An arbitrarily chosen payoff matrix of the stag-hunt game is given in Table 4. 
The same as in the two-player market entry game, each player has to choose between a safe 
option (“hunt hare”) and a risky one (“hunt stag”). If a player decides to hunt hare, her or his 
payoff is 3 ECUs. Hunting stag yields either 4 ECUs or 0 ECUs, depending on the other 
player’s choice. Thus, the game has two pure strategy equilibria, where both players simulta-
neously choose to hunt either stag or hare. In addition, there is a mixed strategy equilibrium, 
where hunting hare is chosen with a probability of 3/4 (given the specific payoffs shown in 
Table 4). 
  Player 2  
  Hunt Stag Hunt Hare  
Player 1 
Hunt Stag (4, 4) (0, 3)  
Hunt Hare (3, 0) (3, 3)  
Table 4: Stag-hunt game 
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Even if risk preferences do not directly affect players’ behavior, players may expect their 
counterparts to be concerned with risk considerations. Such expectations may cause a second-
order effect of risk attitudes. In the experiment by Büyükboyacı (2014), players are provided 
with information about their counterparts’ risk attitudes. Interestingly, players coordinate to 
the safe strategy (“hunt hare”) if they are informed that the other player is risk averse. This 
finding underlines that people themselves perceive risk attitudes to be a relevant factor in the 
stag-hunt game. In this vein, the study by Büyükboyacı (2014) also gives rise to the question 
of whether stereotypes related to other people’s risk attitudes affect one’s own behavior. This 
issue is studied in more depth in Essay #1. 
2.2 Trust Games 
The binary-choice trust game introduced in Section 1 is closely related to the continuous trust 
game of Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995), which has received considerable attention in 
experimental and behavioral economics during the last decades. In a meta-analysis, Johnson 
and Mislin (2011) review 162 repetitions of this game, involving more than 23,000 participants. 
For economists, trust games are a reliable measure of trust at the individual level, because they 
allow the elicitation of individual preferences in a monetarily incentivized way. As such, trust 
games are expected to be less prone to response biases than, for instance, survey measures are. 
Another advantage of trust games might be that standard economic theory has a clear predic-
tion of how rational people should behave in trust games. Assuming rationality and self-cen-
tered preferences, individuals should not exhibit trust in equilibrium. However, countless rep-
etitions of the trust game have shown that individuals deviate from this theoretical benchmark: 
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They send and return positive amounts, even when large amounts are at stake (Johansson-
Stenman, Mahmud, & Martinsson, 2005). 
The importance of trust is widely undisputed in economics as well as in other social 
sciences. Arrow (1972, p. 357) stated that “virtually every commercial transaction has within 
itself an element of trust, certainly any transaction conducted over a period of time. It can be 
plausibly argued that much of the economic backwardness in the world can be explained by 
the lack of mutual confidence.” Since then, numerous studies have provided support for Arrow’s 
seminal conjecture: Trust has been shown to reduce transaction costs, to increase the economic 
performance of firms and governments, and to promote economic growth (e.g. Bromiley & 
Cummings, 1995; Knack & Keefer, 1997; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997; 
Zak & Knack, 2001). Given the broad scope of trust, it is not surprising that a multitude of 
definitions of trust have emerged over the last decades (see, e.g., McKnight & Chervany, 2001 
for an overview). Trust games are intended to measure trust according to the definition of trust 
given by Coleman (1990), who posited three conditions for the existence of trust. First, the 
decision of whether to trust has to be a risky one. Second, rewarding trust has to be costly for 
the trusted party. Third, trusting has to increase the total payoff, i.e. the sum of the trusting 
party’s and the trusted party’s payoff. The continuous trust game by Berg et al. (1995) as well 
as the binarized version used in the present thesis (Bohnet & Zeckhauser, 2004) meet all three 
requirements. 
Numerous scholars have posited a close relationship between trust and risk (see Mayer, 
Davis, & Schoorman, 1995 and references herein). In line with this view, Coleman (1990) argues 
that “situations involving trust constitute a subclass of those involving risk”. Thus, it is not 
surprising that the role of risk attitudes in the context of trust has attracted much interest. 
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The related literature can be subdivided into two broad categories. The first category focuses 
on correlations between risk attitudes and trusting behavior at the individual level. Studies 
falling into this category elicit trust and risk attitudes by using different concepts to measure 
each variable, e.g. the continuous trust game as a measure of trust and the multiple price list 
approach (Holt & Laury, 2002) for measuring risk aversion. The evidence reported in this 
literature is mixed. Eckel and Wilson (2004) run a binary-choice trust game and implement 
behavioral measures as well as survey measures to elicit subjects’ risk attitudes. None of these 
instruments reveals a significant correlation between individual risk attitudes and the decision 
to trust. However, other scholars argue that the decision whether to trust is ambiguous rather 
than risky (Corcos, Pannequin, & Bourgeois-Gironde, 2012; Houser, Schunk, & Winter, 2010), 
because the probabilities of trust being rewarded or trust being betrayed are a priori unknown 
to decision makers (see footnote on p. 1). Therefore, Corcos et al. (2012) elicit ambiguity pref-
erences by means of a multiple price list method, where subjects have to choose between risky 
and ambiguous lotteries. They find a significant negative correlation between ambiguity aver-
sion and trust. A third contribution stands out with respect to the subject pool. Whereas the 
participants of the Eckel and Wilson (2004) and the Corcos et al. (2012) experiments are college 
students, Schechter (2007) conducts a trust game among rural villagers from Paraguay. Also 
using a lottery choice task to elicit risk attitudes, she finds a significant negative correlation 
between subjects’ risk aversion and their willingness to trust. This result is remarkable, as the 
amounts at stake are substantially higher compared to Eckel and Wilson (2004) and Corcos et 
al. (2012). 
The second branch of the literature has been largely inspired by the seminal contribution 
of Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004), who propose a novel between-subjects design to disentangle 
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the influence of risk preferences on trust from additional social motives. The approach is based 
on comparing decisions made in two treatments: a binary-choice trust game (which has been 
briefly introduced in Section 1) and a risky dictator game. In both games, subjects acting as 
trustors have to choose between a safe and a risky option, and their decisions determine their 
own outcome and the outcome of a second player. In the baseline treatment, denoted as the 
“trust game”, the outcome of the risky option is determined by the second player. The extensive 
form is depicted in Figure 2. In the control treatment, denoted as the “risky dictator game”, 
the human agent is replaced by a lottery. It is ensured that both treatments yield the same 
probability distributions over the safe and the risky option. 
 
Figure 2: Binary-choice trust game 
Another feature of the Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004) design is that subjects’ choices are 
disentangled from subjects’ beliefs about the probability distribution of the risky option 
(Bohnet et al., 2008; Bohnet, Herrmann, & Zeckhauser, 2010). Rather than simply choosing 
the safe or the risky option, subjects are asked to state the probability at which they would 
prefer the risky to the safe option, i.e. their so-called minimum acceptable probability (MAP). 
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An MAP below or equal to the actual reward probability rpa indicates that the risky option is 
chosen, whereas MAP > rpa indicates the contrary. The actual reward probability rpa is de-
rived from second players’ actual choices in the “trust game” treatment. The procedures are 
outlined in more detail in Essays #2.1, #2.2, and #2.3, which all build on the binary-choice 
trust game by Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004). 
 The experiments conducted by Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004) confirm the hypothesis 
that individuals treat social risk in a different manner than conventional risk. Specifically, 
individuals state higher MAPs in the “trust game” than in the “risky dictator game”, i.e. they 
demand a social risk premium. From this finding, the authors conclude that individuals are 
betrayal averse: They seem to attribute an additional disutility to the fact that an unfavorable 
outcome is caused by a human being and not by a randomizing device. The betrayal aversion 
phenomenon has been replicated in several other studies (Aimone & Houser, 2012; Fetchen-
hauer & Dunning, 2009, 2012), and has been shown to be persistent across cultures (Bohnet et 
al., 2010; Bohnet & Zeckhauser, 2004). 
3 Social Preferences: A Twofold Source of Social Risk 
Taking 
Understanding social risk taking is closely tied to the question of how decision makers take 
into account the outcomes of their counterparts in social interactions. Countless experiments 
have demonstrated that decision makers do not only pursue their own material interests, even 
if the situation is one-shot and complete anonymity is ensured. In contrast to the assumptions 
of standard economic theory, individuals are sensitive to the way their decisions affect others, 
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and they are frequently willing to sacrifice their own payoff in order to increase others’ payoffs. 
A striking example is the behavior which can be typically observed in the dictator game 
(Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986). In this non-strategic two-player game, one player is 
endowed with an amount of money and then has to decide how to split this amount between 
herself or himself and the second player. The recipient is fully passive and cannot affect the 
outcome of the game. When running the dictator game in the laboratory, researchers typically 
observe that first movers send substantial amounts (see Engel, 2011 for a survey), which is in 
clear conflict with the self-interest hypothesis put forward by standard economic theory. Sim-
ilar deviations can be observed in strategic interactions, such as the trust game. 
In the light of the vast empirical evidence of non-selfish behavior, individuals are said to 
have social preferences (or other-regarding preferences). Empirically, social preferences can be 
studied by means of experimental games. Levitt and List (2007) provide a summary of how 
the outcome of the most popular games can be interpreted in terms of social preferences. 
Formal models designed to explain behavior in these games typically capture social preferences 
by including a social component in the utility function (e.g. Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Dufwen-
berg & Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk & Fischbacher, 2006). The theories of social preferences fall 
into two broad categories (Charness & Rabin, 2000). One category focuses on the distribution 
of payoffs, i.e. individuals are assumed to have preferences about how payoffs are distributed 
among themselves and others. Such outcome-based preferences may be further specified, e.g. 
as altruism, as inequality aversion, or as maximin preferences. Altruism implies that a person’s 
utility increases with the well-being of others. It is also referred to as a form of unconditional 
kindness (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2002). Inequality aversion denotes one’s willingness to sacrifice 
one’s own payoff in order to reach equality in outcomes between oneself and another person. 
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Maximin preferences refer to one’s desire to maximize the minimal outcome in a group (Engel-
mann & Strobel, 2004). A second category of preferences takes into account the importance of 
intentions (Rabin, 1993), which can be defined as “beliefs about why an agent has chosen a 
certain action” (Fehr & Schmidt, 2006). A type of preference belonging to this category is 
that of reciprocity. According to the intentions-based approach, reciprocity implies that people 
respond to a prior kind or unkind action in the same kind or unkind manner. However, reci-
procity is a hybrid concept, since it can also be the result of outcome-based preferences. For 
example, one might think of the trustee in the binary-choice trust game (see Section 1 for 
further details), who has to decide whether to reciprocate the trustor’s trust (“reward” option) 
or not (“betrayal” option). The trustee may decide to reciprocate for two reasons. One the one 
hand, she or he may simply want to increase the trustor’s payoff or to achieve payoff equality 
(outcome-based preference component). On the other hand, she or he may want to “reward” 
the trustor for her or his willingness to trust (intentions-based preference component). 
The assumption of individuals holding social preferences is not novel. Several influential 
economists, such as Smith (1759/1982), Becker (1974), Arrow (1981), Samuelson (1993), and 
Sen (1995), have stressed that maximizing individual welfare is not the only driver of economic 
behavior (Fehr & Schmidt, 2000). Nevertheless, it is still standard in economics to assume self-
interested decision makers. Fehr and Schmidt (2000) suggest two reasons for the persistency 
of the self-interest hypothesis. A first reason refers to the predictive power of the latter, which 
has been demonstrated in many contexts. A second reason is methodological: Assuming non-
standard preferences bears the risk of becoming arbitrary, because any finding can be theoret-
ically founded if the underlying assumptions on preferences are brought in line with it. There-
fore, assuming standard preferences has become a convention among economists. 
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According to the literature, social preferences may be related to social risk taking in at 
least two ways, which are both illustrated in Figure 3. The arrow labeled “1” refers to a direct 
effect of social preferences on social risk taking, whereas the two arrows labeled “2” represent 
an indirect effect. As the essays included in this thesis demonstrate, this general framework is 
not complete and can be refined in several aspects. The way how social preferences directly 
affect social risk taking (see arrow labeled “1”) depends on the type of preferences to be con-
sidered. In the two-player market entry game, positive outcome-based preferences, such as 
altruism, should induce a lower willingness to enter the market for two reasons. First, a market 
entry would cause harm to the opponent if the latter also decided to enter. Second, staying out 
of the market enables the other player to make a profit. In the binary-choice trust game, a 
socially orientated trustor should be more willing to put trust in the other person compared to 
a selfish trustor, because trusting necessarily increases the trustee’s payoff, irrespective of 
whether the latter chooses to reward or to betray. Thus, in both games, positive outcome-based 
preferences are oppositely related to social risk taking: Whereas the former raise the willingness 
to take social risk in the binary-choice trust game, the opposite is true in the two-player market 
entry game. Intentions-based preferences, by contrast, may induce different direct effects of 
social risk taking than outcome-based preferences do, as will be outlined in more detail in 
Section 4.2. 
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Figure 3: Connections between social preferences and social risk taking 
The indirect connection between social preferences and social risk taking (see arrows la-
beled “2”) involves people’s beliefs about their counterparts’ actions as a third variable. For-
mally speaking, social preferences may affect social risk taking through the mediation of beliefs 
(Altmann, Dohmen, & Wibral, 2008; Blanco, Engelmann, Koch, & Normann, 2014). It is in 
line with intuition that in strategic situations individuals rely on their beliefs concerning the 
action of others (see arrow labeled “2” on the right). Costa-Gomes, Huck, and Weizsäcker 
(2014) explicitly show that there is a causal relationship between beliefs and actions in the 
trust game. However, it is less obvious as to why preferences should affect beliefs (see arrow la-
beled “2” on the left). Standard economic theory typically assumes independency between pref-
erences and beliefs, but this assumption conflicts with the empirical evidence that individuals 
rely on their own preferences when predicting the preferences of others (Mullen et al., 1985; 
Ross et al., 1977). This so-called consensus effect evokes a correlation between beliefs and 
preferences, and establishes thus an indirect link between social preferences and social risk 
taking (see arrows labeled “2”), which is entangled with the direct effect of social preferences 
on social risk taking (see arrow labeled “1”). 
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4 Integrated View of the Essays 
4.1 Overview 
In Essay #1, I study the interplay between physical attractiveness and gender in a two-player 
market entry game (Kahneman, 1988; Selten & Güth, 1982). Especially, I examine whether 
subjects’ behavior is affected by the physical appearance of the other participants. According 
to the literature, the effect of appearance on behavior may be carried out through two channels. 
First, people may be prone to stereotypes related to physical appearance and risk taking. Based 
on evolutionary considerations, I hypothesize that good-looking people are considered to be 
more willing to take social risk, and that people taking part in a two-player market entry game 
rely on this stereotype when predicting their opponent’s behavior. Second, people may have a 
preference for good-looking counterparts, i.e. a tendency to refrain from market entry in order 
to not harm the other player or in order to enable the other player to make a profit. 
Given the scope of Essay #1, one of the key challenges is to elicit the physical attrac-
tiveness of the study participants. I make use of an application designed for mobile electronic 
devices, which allows the rating of individuals with regard to their facial attractiveness based 
on symmetry measures. As a second measure, participants are asked to privately judge the 
other participants’ attractiveness. 
In line with the literature, I find that co-players’ appearance affects individual decision 
making through two distinct transmission channels: a stereotype-based and a preference-based 
channel. Both channels are interacted with gender. Females expect other females who are rated 
as physically attractive to be more willing to enter the market. As subjects behave rationally 
with regard to their beliefs, good-looking females face fewer market entries in female dyads. 
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Similarly to females, males enter the market with a lower likelihood when facing a good-looking 
female co-player. However, males’ motivation is preference-based, because their predictions of 
females’ behavior are not affected by females’ appearance. Taken together, physically attractive 
females face a lower risk of being competed against. This applies to both same-sex and mixed-
sex dyads, but for different reasons. 
In Essay #2.1, my co-authors and I study the role of trustworthiness beliefs in a binary-
choice trust game (Bohnet & Zeckhauser, 2004). The term “trustworthiness beliefs” refers to 
trustors’ predictions of trustees’ behavior. We hypothesize that trustors decrease their willing-
ness to trust in order to avoid negative emotions associated with unfulfilled expectations, in-
cluding feelings of disappointment or regret. To test our hypothesis, which largely builds on 
theoretical and empirical evidence from social psychology, we conduct a laboratory experiment 
including three parts. First, participants take part in a binary-choice trust game, either in the 
trustor or in the trustee role. Second, participants have to guess the proportion of trustees who 
have actually chosen to reward trust. In our analysis, guesses are used as a proxy for trustors’ 
trustworthiness beliefs. Third, participants’ social value orientation (Griesinger & Livingston, 
1973; Liebrand, 1984) is elicited by means of the SVO Slider Measure (Murphy, Ackermann, 
& Handgraaf, 2011). Generally speaking, the SVO Slider Measure serves as a measure of out-
come-based preferences (Murphy & Ackermann, 2014). It provides a continuous measure of 
social value orientation, and allows the classification of individuals into the following four 
categories (see Essay #2.1 for further details): altruists, competitors, proselfs, and prosocials. 
In line with our initial hypothesis, we find that optimism about others’ trustworthiness 
and trust are negatively correlated. This effect is more profound if we control for trustors’ 
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social value orientation in the respective regression model. Taken together, our findings estab-
lish an indirect relationship between social value orientation and trust: Social value orientation 
increases trustors’ optimism, which in turn lower one’s willingness to trust. The negative cor-
relation between optimism and trust is more pronounced for trustors who expect the trust case 
to occur. This finding is fully in line with our reasoning, because we expect the respective 
trustors to be more concerned with the anticipation of negative emotions than others are. 
In Essay #2.2, my co-authors and I study the role of perceived obligations in a binary-
choice trust game (Bohnet & Zeckhauser, 2004). Our research is largely inspired by Buchan, 
Croson, and Solnick (2008), who have pointed out the relevance of perceived obligations in the 
context of trust. However, the scope of Buchan et al. (2008) is limited to the obligations which 
subjects feel with respect to their own decisions. Our focus, by contrast, lies on the obligations 
which trustors assign to their counterparts having the trustee role. In addition, we investigate 
whether trustors behave in line with their obligation statements when taking the trustee role 
in a repeated binary-choice trust game with reversed roles. 
Our main result is straightforward: The higher the obligation which a trustor assigns to 
the trustee role, the less she or he is willing to trust. We argue that norm-orientated trustors 
anticipate that they will experience negative emotions should trustees violate their obligation 
to reciprocate. In order to avoid norm violation, trustors lower their willingness to trust. As a 
second result, our experiment reveals that trustors behave consistently with their obligation 
statements when taking the trustee role: Subjects who consider trustees to be obligated to 
reward trust, reward trust to a greater extent than others do. 
In Essay #2.3, my co-author and I study a repeated binary-choice trust game (Bohnet 
& Zeckhauser, 2004) in which participants take the trustor role and then take the trustee role, 
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and vice versa. Our objective is to shed light on the relationship between trust and trustwor-
thiness (i.e. whether to reward or to betray trust) within individuals. In line with previous 
studies, we find that subjects’ willingness to trust is positively correlated with their trustwor-
thiness. However, the relationship between trust and trustworthiness is moderated by subjects’ 
trustworthiness beliefs. If subjects hold optimistic trustworthiness beliefs (i.e. they expect trus-
tees to reward trust), their willingness to trust is positively correlated with their own willing-
ness to reward. The contrary relationship applies to pessimistic subjects. We argue that the 
existence of social preferences, measured in terms of trustworthiness, generates positive and 
negative emotions with respect to the experience of being rewarded and being betrayed. This 
implies that a person holding social preferences experiences a higher amount of emotions when 
being rewarded or being betrayed than a purely selfish person does in either situation. If “social” 
people place a priori more emphasis on the positive emotions of being rewarded than on the 
negative emotions of being betrayed, the existence of social preferences induces a higher will-
ingness to trust, and thus a positive correlation between trust and trustworthiness. By contrast, 
the correlation is negative if people’s attention lies on the negative emotions of being betrayed. 
Based on evidence from psychology, we suggest further that trustworthiness beliefs may deter-
mine whether people focus on the emotions of being rewarded or on the emotions of being 
betrayed. Specifically, optimists concentrate more on the positive emotions of being rewarded 
than pessimists do. 
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4.2 Connecting Links 
In the present section, I elaborate connecting links between the essays presented above. In fact, 
each essay reveals specific behavioral mechanisms which can be mapped to the general frame-
work of social risk taking developed in Sections 1 and 3. As outlined in Essay #1, the appear-
ance of one’s opponent may affect an individual’s market entry decision at two different levels. 
The influence may be carried out either through a beliefs-based or a preference-based channel. 
As a second result, Essay #1 reveals that the relevance of the respective channel for actual 
decision making depends on how female and male participants are matched. Thus, gender 
serves as a moderator for the relationship between appearance, preferences, and expectations. 
The two main results obtained from Essay #1 are summarized in Figure 4, which extends the 
general framework depicted in Figure 1 (see p. 6) and Figure 3 (see p. 19) to the context of the 
two-player market entry game (except for the direct relationship between beliefs and prefer-
ences, which does not fall in the scope of Essay #1). The arrows labeled “1” and “2” denote the 
beliefs-based and the preference-based channel, respectively. The arrows labeled “3” refer to the 
moderator effect of gender. 
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Figure 4: Connections between co-player appearance and market entry decision 
Based on a binary-choice trust game, Essays #2.1, #2.2, and #2.3 explore the relation-
ship between social preferences, trustworthiness expectations, and trust. The results from all 
three essays are summarized in Figure 5, which extends the general framework depicted in 
Figure 1 (see p. 6) and Figure 3 (see p. 19) to the specific context of trust. Essay #2.1 reveals 
a negative relationship between trustworthiness beliefs and trust (see arrow labeled “2”), due 
to the avoidance of anticipated disappointment or regret. As a second result, we demonstrate 
that this effect is part of an indirect effect, which links social preferences, measured in terms 
of social value orientation, to trust through the mediation of trustworthiness beliefs (see arrows 
labeled “1” and “2”). Besides the negative effect of trustworthiness beliefs on trust, the indirect 
effect builds on a consensus effect inducing a positive relationship between social value orien-
tation and trustworthiness beliefs (see arrow labeled “1”): Socially orientated trustors expect 
trustees to behave socially, i.e. to be trustworthy, whereas the contrary is true for selfish 
trustors. The triangular relationship between social value orientation, trustworthiness beliefs, 
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and trust is completed by a positive direct effect of social value orientation on trust (see arrow 
labeled “3”). 
Figure 5: Connections between social preferences, trustworthiness expectations, and trust 
Whereas Essay #2.1 investigates the role of trustworthiness expectations in terms of the 
predicted behavior of others, Essay #2.2 focuses on the obligations which trustors assign to 
the trustee role (hereafter denoted as “trustworthiness obligations”), which can be considered 
as trustors’ moral demands toward trustees and thus as a particular type of expectation. We 
find a negative correlation between trustworthiness obligations and one’s willingness to trust. 
As an underlying reason, we suggest that individuals who have internalized social norms related 
to trustworthiness are wary of these norms being violated by others. This finding is somewhat 
similar to Essay #2.1, where we suggest that people seek to avoid being worse off than they 
initially expected. Technically, one might argue that trustworthiness obligations are positively 
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correlated with trustworthiness beliefs. In this case, the negative effect of trustworthiness ob-
ligations on trust would be only a variation of the findings reported in Essay #2.1. To invali-
date this concern, we control for trustworthiness beliefs, measured in a similar manner to 
Essay #2.1, in the regression analysis of Essay #2.2. In this vein, we can show that the effect 
of trustworthiness obligations revealed by Essay #2.2 is empirically distinct from the effect of 
avoiding unfulfilled trustworthiness beliefs put forth in Essay #2.1. 
Essay #2.3 studies the intrapersonal relationship between trust and trustworthiness by 
means of a within-subject experiment, in which participants take the trustor role and then take 
the trustee role, and vice versa. We find that trustworthiness beliefs serve as a moderator for 
the relationship between trust and trustworthiness within individuals (see arrow labeled “4”): 
Optimistic beliefs promote a positive relationship between trust and trustworthiness, whereas 
the contrary is true for pessimistic beliefs. It is obvious that Essay #2.3 is also closely related 
to Essays #2.1, because both essays study the relationship between social preferences, meas-
ured either in terms of social value orientation (Essay #2.1) or trustworthiness (Essay #2.3), 
and trustworthiness beliefs. However, the implications of both essays are complementary rather 
than interchangeable: As Figure 5 points out, Essay #2.1 stresses the role of trustworthiness 
beliefs as a mediator for the relationship between social preferences and trust, whereas Es-
say #2.3 suggests that trustworthiness beliefs serve as a moderator. 
The similar scope of Essays #2.1 and #2.3 might raise the question of why two distinct 
measures of social preferences are used. In fact, it is plausible to assume that the strength of 
the observed effects depends on whether social preferences are measured in terms of either 
social value orientation or of trustworthiness, because both measures differ in a crucial aspect. 
The concept of social value orientation captures outcome-based preferences only (Murphy 
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& Ackermann, 2014) (see Section 3 for further details). Trustworthiness, by contrast, is a result 
of reciprocal preferences and incorporates thus both an outcome-based and an intentions-based 
preference component. This conceptual distinction, which is illustrated in Figure 6, is especially 
relevant for the moderator effect. As outlined in Section 4.1, the reason for the moderator effect 
is that individuals holding social preferences experience additional emotions when being re-
warded or being betrayed, compared to fully selfish individuals: Trustworthy individuals expe-
rience additional positive emotions when being rewarded and additional negative emotions 
when being betrayed. Obviously, these emotions depend on how people evaluate the actions of 
others with respect to the latter’s intentions. Therefore, the moderator effect is presumably 
more pronounced if social preferences are measured in terms of intensions-based preferences, 
i.e. in terms of trustworthiness. The mediator effect, by contrast, ought to depend to a smaller 
extent on the way social preferences are measured. As outlined earlier, the mediator effect 
mainly builds on a consensus effect, i.e. a strong connection between social preferences and 
trustworthiness beliefs. Intuitively, one would expect trustworthiness to be an even better 
predictor of trustworthiness beliefs than social value orientation is. However, a major advantage 
of using social value orientation as a measure of social preferences is that the experimental 
elicitation of trust and the experimental elicitation of social value orientation are contextually 
independent of each other. 
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Figure 6: Measures of social preferences used in Essays #2.1 and #2.3 
4.3 Overall Contribution, Limitations, and Open Questions 
The contribution of the essays included in the present thesis is multi-dimensional. At the meta-
level, each essay shows the “flip side” of a well-established behavioral mechanism. In the context 
of trust, an example of such a behavioral duality can be found in Buchan et al. (2008), who 
investigate whether feelings of obligation affect behavior in the trust game. The authors find 
that trustors who feel obligated to trust are more likely to send any money compared to trustors 
who lack such obligation feelings. This finding is not surprising in the light of the social di-
mension of trust outlined in Section 3. Female trustors, however, seem to behave in opposition 
to their obligation feelings: The degree to which they feel obligated to trust is negatively cor-
related with their amounts sent. Buchan et al. (2008) attribute this counterintuitive finding to 
a reactance effect (Brehm, 1966). According to this effect, the feeling of being obligated to take 
a certain action limits the range of choices, which people perceive as being available to them. 
This perceived limitation may motivate people to behave in opposition to their obligation. 
The essays included in the present thesis underline the importance of dual relationships 
in two particular situations involving social risk: the two-player market entry game and the 
binary-choice trust game. The findings reported in the essays are similar to Buchan et al. 
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(2008), as they indirectly or directly reveal counteracting effects. Moreover, the authors point 
out that certain effects may have multiple causes. In the following, I briefly summarize the 
dualities revealed in this thesis: 
− In Essay #1, I identify a beliefs-based and a preference-based relationship between one’s 
behavior in a two-player market entry game and the physical attractiveness of one’s 
opponent. Future research should examine whether this duality can be found in other 
economic contexts, where, for example, the two effects of appearance counteract each 
other. 
− In Essay #2.1, we encounter dualities in two aspects. The first dual finding concerns the 
way in which beliefs are mapped into decisions. From the perspective of expected utility, 
one would expect optimistic trustworthiness beliefs to be associated with higher levels of 
trust (e.g. Berg et al., 1995). However, the effect of avoiding unfulfilled expectations 
examined in Essay #2.1 imposes a negative correlation between trustworthiness beliefs 
and trust. Future experimental research should assess the relative size of both effects. 
The negative effect of trustworthiness beliefs on trust induces a second duality: In anal-
ogy to trustworthiness beliefs, social value orientation carries out two counteracting ef-
fects on trust.  
− Essay #2.2 reveals a duality with respect to norm orientation. We replicate the finding 
reported in Buchan et al. (2008) that feelings of obligation increase trustors’ willingness 
to trust. However, we also observe that norm-orientated trustors who consider trustees 
to be obligated to reciprocate are less willing to trust than trustors who negate such an 
obligation.  
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− In Essay #2.3, we investigate the influence of trustworthiness on trust in a within-subject 
design. We find that trustworthiness carries out either a positive or a negative influence 
on trust, depending on whether people hold pessimistic or optimistic trustworthiness 
beliefs. The moderating effect of trustworthiness beliefs constitutes an indirect connection 
between trustworthiness beliefs and trust, which adds to the direct connections discussed 
in Essay #2.1.  
The variety of dualities discussed in the essays underlines that understanding social risk taking 
behavior is challenging, since many of the underlying behavioral patterns are conditional. In 
this context, the present thesis especially emphasizes the relevance of moderator effects (Es-
says #1 and #2.3) and mediator effects (Essays #1 and #2.1), which both shape the triangular 
relationship between expectations, preferences, and social risk taking.
  
32 
 
References 
Aimone, J. A., & Houser, D. (2012). What You Don’t Know Won’t Hurt You: A Laboratory 
Analysis of Betrayal Aversion. Experimental Economics, 15(4), 571–588. 
Altmann, S., Dohmen, T., & Wibral, M. (2008). Do the Reciprocal Trust Less? Economics 
Letters, 99(3), 454–457. 
Arrow, K. J. (1972). Gifts and Exchanges. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1(4), 343–362. 
Arrow, K. J. (1981). Optimal and Voluntary Income Redistribution. In S. Rosenfield (Ed.), 
Economic Welfare and the Economics of Soviet Socialism: Essays in Honor of Abram Berg-
son. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Aydogan, G. (2015). Trust and Social Risk: Neuro-Scientific Foundations of Economic Deci-
sion-Making Under Strategic Uncertainty (Dissertation). Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, 
Munich. 
Becker, G. S. (1974). A Theory of Social Interactions. Journal of Political Economy, 82(6), 
1063–1093. 
Ben-Ner, A., & Putterman, L. (2001). Trusting and Trustworthiness. Boston University Law 
Review, 81, 523–551. 
Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., & McCabe, K. (1995). Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History. Games 
and Economic Behavior, 10(1), 122–142. 
Blanco, M., Engelmann, D., Koch, A. K., & Normann, H.-T. (2014). Preferences and Beliefs in 
a Sequential Social Dilemma: A Within-Subjects Analysis. Games and Economic Behavior, 
87, 122–135. 
Bohnet, I., Greig, F., Herrmann, B., & Zeckhauser, R. (2008). Betrayal Aversion: Evidence 
from Brazil, China, Oman, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States. American Economic 
Review, 98(1), 294–310. 
Bohnet, I., Herrmann, B., & Zeckhauser, R. (2010). Trust and the Reference Points for Trust-
worthiness in Gulf and Western Countries. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 125(2), 811–
828. 
Bohnet, I., & Zeckhauser, R. (2004). Trust, Risk and Betrayal. Journal of Economic Behavior 
and Organization, 55(4), 467–484. 
Bolton, G. E., & Ockenfels, A. (2000). ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competi-
tion. American Economic Review, 90(1), 166–193. 
Brehm, J. W. (1966). A Theory of Psychological Reactance. Oxford: Academic Press. 
Breuer, W., Helduser, C., & Schade, P. (2016). Breaking the Rules: Anticipation of Norm 
Violation in a Binary-Choice Trust Game. Economics Letters, 146, 123–125. 
Bromiley, P., & Cummings, L. L. (1995). Transactions Costs in Organizations with Trust. In 
R. J. Lewicki & B. H. Sheppard (Eds.), Research on Negotiation in Organizations (Vol. 5, 
pp. 219–247). Greenwich: Jai Press. 
  
33 
 
Buchan, N. R., Croson, R. T. A., & Solnick, S. (2008). Trust and Gender: An Examination of 
Behavior and Beliefs in the Investment Game. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organi-
zation, 68(3), 466–476. 
Buchan, N. R., Johnson, E. J., & Croson, R. T. (2006). Let's Get Personal: An International 
Examination of the Influence of Communication, Culture and Social Distance on Other 
Regarding Preferences. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 60(3), 373–398. 
Büyükboyacı, M. (2014). Risk Attitudes and the Stag-Hunt Game. Economics Letters, 124(3), 
323–325. 
Charness, G. & Rabin, M. (2000). Social Preferences: Some Simple Tests and a New Model 
(Unpublished Manuscript). 
Coleman, J. S. (1990). Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Corcos, A., Pannequin, F., & Bourgeois-Gironde, S. (2012). Is Trust an Ambiguous Rather 
Than a Risky Decision? Economics Bulletin, 32(3), 2255–2266. 
Costa-Gomes, M. A., Huck, S., & Weizsäcker, G. (2014). Beliefs and Actions in the Trust 
Game: Creating Instrumental Variables to Estimate the Causal Effect. Games and Eco-
nomic Behavior, 88, 298–309. 
Croson, R., & Gneezy, U. (2009). Gender Differences in Preferences. Journal of Economic 
Literature, 47(2), 448–474. 
Dufwenberg, M., & Kirchsteiger, G. (2004). A Theory of Sequential Reciprocity. Games and 
Economic Behavior, 47(2), 268–298. 
Eckel, C. C., & Wilson, R. K. (2004). Is Trust a Risky Decision? Journal of Economic Behavior 
and Organization, 55(4), 447–465. 
Engel, C. (2011). Dictator Games: A Meta Study. Experimental Economics, 14(4), 583–610. 
Engelmann, D., & Strobel, M. (2004). Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin Preferences 
in Simple Distribution Experiments. American Economic Review, 94(4), 857–869. 
Falk, A., & Fischbacher, U. (2006). A Theory of Reciprocity. Games and Economic Behavior, 
54(2), 293–315. 
Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2002). Why Social Preferences Matter: The Impact of Non‐Selfish 
Motives on Competition, Cooperation and Incentives. Economic Journal, 112(478), C1-C33. 
Fehr, E. & Schmidt, K. M. (2000). Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity: Evidence and Eco-
nomic Applications (Unpublished Manuscript). 
Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. M. (2006). The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism - 
Experimental Evidence and New Theories. In S.-C. Kolm & J. M. Ythier (Eds.), Handbooks 
in Economics: Vol. 23. Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity 
(pp. 615–691). Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
Fetchenhauer, D., & Dunning, D. (2009). Do People Trust Too Much or Too Little? Journal 
of Economic Psychology, 30(3), 263–276. 
  
34 
 
Fetchenhauer, D., & Dunning, D. (2012). Betrayal Aversion versus Principled Trustfulness: 
How to Explain Risk Avoidance and Risky Choices in Trust Games. Journal of Economic 
Behavior and Organization, 81(2), 534–541. 
Griesinger, D. W., & Livingston, J. W. (1973). Toward a Model of Interpersonal Motivation 
in Experimental Games. Systems Research and Behavioral Science, 18(3), 173–188. 
Heinemann, F., Nagel, R., & Ockenfels, P. (2009). Measuring Strategic Uncertainty in Coordi-
nation Games. Review of Economic Studies, 76(1), 181–221. 
Holt, C. A., & Laury, S. K. (2002). Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects. American Economic 
Review, 92(5), 1644–1655. 
Houser, D., Schunk, D., & Winter, J. (2010). Distinguishing Trust from Risk: An Anatomy of 
the Investment Game. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 74(1), 72–81. 
Johansson-Stenman, O., Mahmud, M., & Martinsson, P. (2005). Does Stake Size Matter in 
Trust Games? Economics Letters, 88(3), 365–369. 
Johnson, N. D., & Mislin, A. A. (2011). Trust Games: A Meta-Analysis. Journal of Economic 
Psychology, 32(5), 865–889. 
Kagel, J. H., & Roth, A. E. (Eds.). (2009). The Handbook of Experimental Economics. Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press. 
Kahneman, D. (1988). Experimental Economics: A Psychological Perspective. In R. Tietz, W. 
Albers, & R. Selten (Eds.), Bounded Rational Behavior in Experimental Games and Markets 
(pp. 11–18). Berlin: Springer. 
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L., & Thaler, R. (1986). Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: 
Entitlements in the Market. American Economic Review, 76(4), 728–741. 
Knack, S., & Keefer, P. (1997). Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Coun-
try Investigation. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(4), 1251–1288. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997). Legal Determinants 
of External Finance. Journal of Finance, 52(3), 1131–1150. 
Levitt, S. D., & List, J. A. (2007). What Do Laboratory Experiments Measuring Social Pref-
erences Reveal About the Real World? Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21(2), 153–174. 
Liebrand, W. B. G. (1984). The Effect of Social Motives, Communication and Group Size on 
Behaviour in an N‐Person Multi‐Stage Mixed‐Motive Game. European Journal of Social 
Psychology, 14(3), 239–264. 
Mayer, R. C., Davis, J. H., & Schoorman, F. D. (1995). An Integrative Model of Organizational 
Trust. Academy of Management Review, 20(3), 709–734. 
McKnight, D. H., & Chervany, N. L. (2001). Trust and Distrust Definitions: One Bite at a 
Time. In R. Falcone, S. Munindar, & T. Yao-Hua (Eds.), Trust in Cyber-Societies: Inte-
grating the Human and Artificial Perspectives (pp. 27–54). Berlin: Springer. 
  
35 
 
Mullen, B., Atkins, J. L., Champion, D. S., Edwards, C., Hardy, D., Story, J. E., & Vanderklok, 
M. (1985). The False Consensus Effect: A Meta-Analysis of 115 Hypothesis Tests. Journal 
of Experimental Social Psychology, 21(3), 262–283. 
Murphy, R. O., & Ackermann, K. A. (2014). Social Value Orientation: Theoretical and Meas-
urement Issues in the Study of Social Preferences. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 
18(1), 13–41. 
Murphy, R. O., Ackermann, K. A., & Handgraaf, M. (2011). Measuring Social Value Orienta-
tion. Judgment and Decision Making, 6(8), 771–781. 
Rabin, M. (1993). Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics. American Eco-
nomic Review, 83(5), 1281–1302. 
Ross, L., Greene, D., & House, P. (1977). The “False Consensus Effect”: An Egocentric Bias in 
Social Perception and Attribution Processes. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 
13(3), 279–301. 
Samuelson, P. A. (1993). Altruism as a Problem Involving Group Versus Individual Selection 
in Economics and Biology. American Economic Review, 83(2), 143–148. 
Schechter, L. (2007). Traditional Trust Measurement and the Risk Confound: An Experiment 
in Rural Paraguay. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 62(2), 272–292. 
Selten, R., & Güth, W. (1982). Equilibrium Point Selection in a Class of Market Entry Games. 
In M. Deistler, E. Fürst, & G. Schwödiauer (Eds.), Games, Economic Dynamics, and Time 
Series Analysis (pp. 101–116). Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag HD. 
Sen, A. (1995). Moral Codes and Economic Success. In C. S. Britten & A. Hamlin (Eds.), 
Market Capitalism and Moral Values. Aldershot: Edward Elgar. 
Smith, A. (1982). The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund (Original work 
published 1759). 
Trautmann, S. T., & Vieider, F. M. (2012). Social Influences on Risk Attitudes: Applications 
in Economics. In S. Roeser, R. Hillerbrand, P. Sandin, & M. Peterson (Eds.), Handbook of 
Risk Theory: Epistemology, Decision Theory, Ethics, and Social Implications of Risk 
(pp. 575–600). Berlin: Springer. 
Zak, P. J., & Knack, S. (2001). Trust and Growth. Economic Journal, 111(470), 295–321. 
  
  
36 
 
 
  
37 
 
 
The Twofold Beauty Premium: Preference-Based and 
Beliefs-Based Behavior in an Anti-Coordination Game
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Abstract 
I study the role of physical attractiveness and gender in a two-player market entry game with 
a safe option and a risky option. Participants are provided with photos of their co-players’ 
faces before they make their decisions. I find that co-players’ attractiveness affects individual 
decision making through two distinct transmission channels: a stereotype-based and a prefer-
ence-based channel. Both are interacted with gender. Females expect other females who are
rated as physically attractive to be less risk averse. As subjects behave rationally regarding
their beliefs, good-looking females face fewer risky decisions in same-sex dyads. Males enter the 
market less often when facing a female co-player. However, males’ motivation is preference-
based, because their predictions of females’ behavior are not affected by females’ appearance.
Thus, physically attractive females face fewer market entries in both same-sex and mixed-sex 
settings, but for different reasons. This confirms the existence of a twofold “beauty premium”
in the labor market. 
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1 Introduction 
In many social interactions, good-looking people seem to benefit from their appearance and the 
way others respond to it. The seminal study by Hamermesh and Biddle (1994) revealed a 
significant “beauty premium” that enables attractive people to earn more money than unat-
tractive people. The authors found that workers who were rated by interviewers as “above 
average” in physical attractiveness earn about 10 to 15 % more than workers who were judged 
to be less physically attractive. Up to now, the existence of a “beauty premium” has been 
documented in various economic contexts, such as fund-raising (Landry, Lange, List, Price, & 
Rupp, 2006), peer-to-peer lending (Ravina, 2012), professional sports (Berri, Simmons, VanGil-
der, & O'Neill, 2011), and political elections (Berggren, Jordahl, & Poutvaara, 2016). 
In the light of the significant economic impact of appearance, it is not surprising that the 
underlying behavioral mechanisms have attracted growing interest over the last years. The 
literature on physical attractiveness proposes two channels through which beauty may operate. 
According to the taste-based discrimination theory by Becker (1957), employers and customers 
derive utility (“pleasure”) from interacting with physically attractive employees. Thus, employ-
ers pay them higher wages in order to extend the time span in which they remain together. 
Another strand of literature focusses on stereotypes related to physical attractiveness. Results 
from these studies indicate that people perceive beauty to be correlated with intelligence and 
mental health (Eagly, Ashmore, Makhijani, & Longo, 1991; Feingold, 1992; Jackson, Hunter, 
& Hodge, 1995; Kanazawa & Kovarb, 2004). Moreover, good-looking people are expected to 
behave more socially (Andreoni & Petrie, 2008; Kahn, Hottes, & Davis, 1971; Mulford, Orbell, 
Shatto, & Stockard, 1998; Solnick & Schweitzer, 1999; Wilson & Eckel, 2006). In a more recent 
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study considering an experimental labor market and a real-effort task for which physical at-
tractiveness does not improve productivity, Mobius and Rosenblat (2006) found that employers 
expected physically attractive workers to perform better at their task. In summary, research 
on stereotypes related to appearance suggests that employers expect to derive positive mone-
tary utility from favoring good-looking employees, contrasting with non-monetary utility, 
which is emphasized by preference-based approaches such as the seminal work of Becker (1957). 
My study captures a key feature of competitive (labor) markets: the willingness to take 
strategic risk and to compete for a scarce resource which cannot be divided between different 
subjects, e.g. jobs and promotions.1 To my knowledge, there is only one study focusing on the 
effect of beauty and gender matching in competitive environments. Dreber, Gerdes, and Gräns-
mark (2013) analyze the impact of appearance on strategies chosen in professional chess 
matches. They find that males but not females take more risk against attractive players of the 
opposite sex. However, this study differs from mine in two ways. On the one hand, it examines 
the risk-taking behavior of individuals who have already decided to take part in a competition 
and have self-selected into a high-risk environment. I look rather at the willingness to enter a 
competition and at the risk which is associated with this decision. On the other hand, chess 
players may choose certain strategies to prove their skills and to impress their opponents. In 
my experiment, such performance considerations are not a relevant factor. 
To shed more light on the role of physical attractiveness in competitive environments, I 
study three research questions. First and foremost, I examine whether subjects’ willingness to 
take strategic risk is affected by co-players’ appearance. A two-step analysis of beliefs and 
 
1 For the sake of brevity, I do not distinguish between risk and ambiguity in this paper. In the follow-
ing, I will speak of risk even if there is ambiguity. 
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actual decisions is conducted to show whether attractiveness affects decisions through a stere-
otype-based or a preference-based mechanism, or both. Since information on gender may facil-
itate coordination between two subjects (Holm, 2000), I investigate in a second step whether 
the potential effect of beauty is conditioned on gender-matching aspects. In the two-player 
market entry game which is studied in this paper, behavior should at least theoretically depend 
on how a subject expects to be perceived by the interaction partner. Therefore, as my third 
research question, I also examine whether risk-taking behavior depends on decision makers’ 
own attractiveness and if so, whether decision makers’ and co-players’ attractiveness interact 
with each other. 
My experiment is largely inspired by the market entry games proposed by Selten and 
Güth (1982) and Kahneman (1988), in which players have to decide simultaneously whether 
to enter an experimental market with a limited capacity. In order to keep the experimental 
framework as simple as possible, I consider a two-player market entry game with a market 
capacity of one. In the first part of the experiment, subjects are matched anonymously. In the 
second part, subjects are provided with photos of their co-players’ faces before they make their 
decisions. I make use of a photo analysis application called nFace to compute individual at-
tractiveness ratings based on a person’s facial symmetry. Facial symmetry has been shown to 
be a reliable predictor of perceived attractiveness (Gangestad, Thornhill, & Yeo, 1994; Gram-
mer & Thornhill, 1994; Perrett et al., 1999; Rhodes, Proffitt, Grady, & Sumich, 1998). Meas-
uring facial symmetry by means of software tools has only recently received attention in eco-
nomic research (see, e.g., Hoegele, Schmidt, & Torgler, 2016; Ravina, 2012). 
The present research offers three features which lead to significant differences from pre-
vious studies which have also examined the role of appearance in strategic interactions. First, 
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the social optimum of the two-person market entry game is non-cooperative. Overall payoffs 
are maximized if one player enters the market while the other one stays out. As mentioned 
before, this feature covers real-life situations which do not allow for equal payoff distributions. 
Second, the participants of my experiment can choose a riskless option, bringing the experiment 
in line with traditional market entry games involving more than two players. If a player decides 
to stay out of the market, her or his payoff is inevitably zero, no matter which alternative the 
co-player chooses. This feature is crucial in terms of my research question: A safe option is 
required to measure individual willingness to take strategic risk. Third, the experiment allows 
an undistorted view of the role of strategic risk-taking behavior, since task performance and 
beliefs related to performance aspects do not need to be considered here. 
Besides the broad literature on the “beauty premium” in the labor market, my study 
contributes to two more strands of research. First, I contribute to the literature on stereotypes 
related to risk-taking behavior. In this field, Ball, Eckel, and Heracleous (2010) report that 
physically attractive individuals are expected to take more financial risk than less attractive 
ones in a lottery selection task. I extend this research by examining whether an equivalent 
stereotype occurs in strategic contexts. Second, I contribute to the literature on the role of 
focal points in coordination and anti-coordination games. Both classes of games refer to situa-
tions where players face strategic risk due to the existence of multiple equilibria in pure strat-
egies. In coordination games, it is mutually beneficial for players to choose similar strategies. 
In anti-coordination games, by contrast, players prefer choosing opposite strategies. In this 
context, Holm (2000) shows that gender may serve as a focal point when two subjects have to 
decide simultaneously on how to divide up a given amount of money between themselves. The 
present study extends this strand of literature by examining whether physical attractiveness 
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provides information which helps subjects to anti-coordinate their actions in the two-player 
market entry game. 
In a nutshell, I find that in the two-person market entry game beauty affects behavior 
through both of the transmission channels which have been proposed in the literature. On the 
one hand, I identify a stereotype relating beauty to strategic risk-taking behavior. Females 
expect physically attractive female co-players to enter the market with a higher likelihood than 
less attractive female co-players, and they adapt their behavior by refraining from market entry 
more often. On the other hand, I find evidence for preference-based decision making in the case 
of males facing female co-players. More precisely, males enter the market less often when facing 
good-looking female co-players. In this regard, my results are in line with taste-based discrim-
ination theory and match basic principles from evolutionary biology. 
As outlined above, the role of gender and appearance has been studied extensively in the 
economic literature. The present study extends this literature by showing that gender and 
appearance also affect decision making in competitive environments. As I conduct a controlled 
laboratory experiment, I can reveal how subjects expect each other to behave and how subjects 
map these beliefs into their actual decisions. Thus, I am not only capable of identifying stere-
otypes and preferences as underlying causes for actual behavior but of disentangling them too. 
To my knowledge, the present study is the first one showing that in strategic interactions 
appearance can operate through both the stereotype-based and the preference-based transmis-
sion channel. 
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental 
framework. In Section 3, hypotheses are derived from the related literature. Section 4 intro-
duces the experimental design and reviews the procedures. Sections 5 and 6 present the results. 
Section 7 concludes. 
2 Two-Player Market Entry Game 
In the market entry game studied in this paper, two players have to decide simultaneously and 
without the other’s knowledge whether to enter a given market which may be profitably ex-
ploited by only one of them. The market capacity and the number of potential entrants are 
exogenously determined and are common knowledge among players. Table 1 shows the respec-
tive payoffs in experimental currency units (ECUs). A player who decides to enter the market 
earns a positive payoff (3.5 ECUs) if the co-player does not enter. On the other hand, a player 
entering the market suffers a loss (-3.5 ECUs) if the co-player enters the market as well. If a 
player decides to stay out of the market, her or his payoff is zero, irrespective of the co-player’s 
choice. As it is mutually beneficial for both players to take different actions, the two-player 
market entry game constitutes an anti-coordination game. Formally, there are two Nash equi-
libria in pure strategies, where one player enters the market while the other player stays out, 
and vice versa. Due to the existence of multiple pure strategy Nash equilibria, the game has a 
third Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies, where subjects randomly choose between entering 
the market and staying out, selecting each option with a probability of 1/2. 
>>> Insert Table 1 about here <<< 
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The two-player market entry game differs from traditional market entry games in two 
aspects. On the one hand, I consider a group of only two potential entrants, whereas other 
studies typically involve 15 or more players (see, e.g., Kahneman, 1988; Selten & Güth, 1982). 
Second, the market capacity is one in all rounds whereas in previous experiments with more 
players, the market capacity differed from round to round. Both simplifications constitute a 
game which is similar to the game of chicken. In this two-player game proposed by Rapoport 
and Chammah (1966), two car drivers are assumed to face each other on a road that is too 
narrow for both cars to pass at the same time. The respective payoff matrix, containing arbi-
trarily set numerical payoffs, is given in Table 2. The players have to decide simultaneously 
whether to yield to the other player or to drive on. The best outcome for each player (1 ECU) 
is to drive on while the other yields. The worst outcome for both players (-10 ECUs) occurs if 
both decide not to yield to each other. A player suffers also a loss (-1 ECU) if she or he decides 
to yield but the co-player does not. Taken together, the game of chicken does not allow players 
to avoid strategic risk, because payoffs always depend on co-players’ actions. In market entry 
games, however, staying out of the market yields neither a gain nor a loss, and constitutes thus 
a safe option. The existence of such a safe option is a required feature of my study, since I seek 
to examine individuals’ willingness to take strategic risk. 
>>> Insert Table 2 about here <<< 
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3 Hypotheses and Related Literature 
3.1 Stereotype Hypothesis 
In the two-player market entry game described in the preceding section, subjects have to choose 
between a risky option and a safe option. If a subject decides to enter the market, her or his 
payoff solely depends on whether the co-player enters the market as well. On the other hand, 
if a subject does not enter the market, her or his payoff is inevitably zero, irrespective of the 
co-player’s decision. In the light of this safe option, subjects might expect co-players’ risk 
preferences to be a relevant factor in the game. As photos are the only source of information 
available to subjects, they may use them to predict their co-players’ behavior. Moreover, ste-
reotypes associated with appearance are likely to be applied, because the great majority of 
participants do not know each other personally and lack therefore valuable personal infor-
mation. 
Research from different disciplines suggests the existence of a beauty stereotype regarding 
risk-taking behavior. A substantial psychological literature shows that people who are physi-
cally more attractive are perceived by others to be physically and mentally healthier. Cunning-
ham (1986) found that men judge women with more attractive faces to be more fertile and be 
likely to experience fewer medical problems. Grammer and Thornhill (1994) documented that 
opposite-sex raters judge more facially attractive people to be healthier than less attractive 
people. Kalick, Zebrowitz, Langlois, and Johnson (1998) replicated these findings using both 
opposite-sex and same-sex raters. Singh (1993) found that not only are women with a lower 
waist-to-hip ratio assumed to be physically healthier, more fertile, and more attractive, but 
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women with lower waist-to-hip ratio report indeed fewer health problems and higher fertility. 
Feingold (1992) shows that the beauty stereotype applies analogously to mental health. 
Why should financial risk taking be linked to physical traits such as beauty? I follow the 
argumentation of Ball et al. (2010), who combine explanations from different fields of research. 
Evolutionary biology suggests that both physical and psychological traits that enhance the 
likelihood of survival become more prevalent in future generations. Physical prowess and risk-
taking behavior are closely related, because the physical prowess of hunters ought to ensure 
success when they take physical risks. Thus, risk-taking behavior is especially helpful for sur-
vival if it is combined with physical prowess. That is the reason why both traits are believed 
to co-evolve. According to psychologists, who tend to view risk taking as a personality trait, 
physical risk preferences should be related to preferences regarding other kinds of risk. Another 
argument put forward by Ball et al. refers to background risk theory. This theory assumes that 
individuals face a portfolio of different kinds of risk that are diversified within individuals. 
Physical prowess reduces physical risk, enabling individuals to take more risk in other domains. 
Various studies from the field of household finance confirm this theory empirically (Eeckhoudt, 
Gollier, & Schlesinger, 1996; Eeckhoudt & Kimball, 1992; Jianakoplos & Bernasek, 1998; Pratt 
& Zeckhauser, 1987; Sunden & Surette, 1998). From the arguments outlined above I derive my 
first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Physically attractive subjects are expected to enter the market more often 
than less attractive ones due to a stereotype relating physical attractiveness 
to strategic risk preferences. If subjects rely on their predictions of co-players’ 
behavior, attractiveness should also affect their decisions. 
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3.2 Gender-Pairing Hypothesis 
In my experiment, subjects are shown photos of their co-players’ faces in order to provide 
information on physical attractiveness. The information on gender that is collaterally trans-
ferred might moderate the relationship between beauty and belief formation that has been 
suggested in Section 3.1, because gender itself may be a strong source of stereotypes. A vast 
body of literature has documented gender differences in risk taking, suggesting that females 
take less risk than males do (see Byrnes, Miller, & Schafer, 1999 for an extended overview of 
gender differences in risk taking). More recently, researchers have begun to report gender ste-
reotypes related to financial risk taking (Eckel & Grossman, 2002, 2008; Siegrist, Cvetkovich, 
& Gutscher, 2002). These studies confirm that females are expected to be more risk averse 
than males, although females’ actual behavior does not always meet this expectation. 
In the light of the gender stereotype related to risk-taking behavior, participants in my 
experiment may use co-players’ sex as an additional source of information to predict co-players’ 
behavior. Implications from psychological dual process theories suggest that the gender stere-
otype may even dominate a potential beauty stereotype, due to differences in the way both 
types of information are cognitively processed. According to the dual process model by Brewer 
(1988), impression formation always starts with an identification stage. At this stage, the stim-
ulus person is automatically classified into categories based on salient characteristics such as 
gender, age, or skin color. Related psychological research on impression formation confirms 
that gender judgment takes place on a shallower level than judgments on less salient dimen-
sions. Bower and Karlin (1974) conduct a recognition test in which subjects who had to judge 
first whether target persons were honest or likeable performed much better than subjects who 
had judged target persons only in terms of gender. In a reaction time study reported by Brewer 
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(1988), subjects were provided with stimulus photos of persons, which contained clear clues 
regarding gender and occupation. Subjects were shown two stimulus photos together and were 
asked to indicate whether the pictures were the same or different in terms of gender or occu-
pations. The experiment revealed that the response time was lower when subjects were sup-
posed to judge occupations and faced stimulus photos of different gender, but not vice versa. 
This finding provides support for the conjecture that information on gender is automatically 
processed, even if gender is not task-relevant. 
The implication that information on gender may be processed with priority to infor-
mation on attractiveness is important because dual process theory suggests that processing will 
be stopped once a “satisfactory resolution of the stimulus information” has been achieved 
(Brewer, 1988). Experimental economists provide indirect evidence for this theory. Subjects 
who have to forecast risky decisions of others ignore personal information on the latter’s actual 
risk preferences in favor of gender stereotypes when gender information is provided first (Gross-
man, 2013). When gender information is provided second, personal information on risk prefer-
ences is taken into account. Thus, the dominance of gender information may also lead to a 
neglect of alternative information. 
If the reasoning outlined above holds, the dominance of gender information should solely 
depend on whether subjects expect gender to be a relevant solution for the problem at hand. 
As the two-player market entry game represents an anti-coordination problem, I argue that 
any information only turns out to be helpful if the information-related stereotype expects play-
ers to act differently. Thus, the gender dominance hypothesis requires mixed-sex pairings. In 
same-sex pairings, the gender stereotype would predict both players to act in the same way 
and would not help subjects to solve the anti-coordination problem. Holm (2000) shows for an 
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experimental battle of the sexes game that gender pairing is indeed crucial for coordination 
and that mixed-sex pairings lead to an increase in earnings. Thus, the gender dominance hy-
pothesis that I developed on the ground of psychological dual process theory has to be modified 
with respect to gender pairing. I propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: In mixed-sex settings, the effect of physical attractiveness on belief formation 
is smaller than in same-sex settings, or may even be absent, because the 
potential beauty stereotype is dominated by a gender stereotype. 
3.3 Preference Hypothesis 
Several field studies have documented that males respond sensitively to female attractiveness 
in economic contexts. For instance, men’s demand for consumer credits increases if a picture 
of an attractive female is included in the advertisement (Bertrand, Karlan, Mullainathan, 
Shafir, & Zinman, 2010). Female attractiveness produces more cooperative behavior by male 
counterparts in high-stakes television game shows (Darai & Grätz, 2013). Men’s contribution 
to a charity increases when they face an attractive female fundraiser (Landry et al., 2006). All 
these findings reflect at least partly preference-based behavior, since they match basic princi-
ples from evolutionary biology, which assumes attractiveness to be a proxy for fertility. How-
ever, preference-based behavior with respect to appearance may be difficult to identify in anon-
ymous environments, such as economic laboratory experiments, where participants are usually 
recruited from large subject pools. According to Becker (1957), taste-based discrimination 
should be most pronounced whenever a subject has a reasonable expectation that she or he 
will experience further interaction with the other person. 
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In fact, experimental research has observed taste-based discrimination under specific con-
ditions only. Mobius and Rosenblat (2006) study a bargaining game where “employers” forecast 
productivity of “workers” who perform a real-effort task. The experiment includes two treat-
ments which differ in the way employers’ forecasts affect workers’ wages. In the first treatment, 
workers’ wages highly depend on employers’ forecasts whereas in the second treatment, the 
relationship between forecasts and wages is set to “weak”. A comparison of the two treatments 
does not provide evidence for taste-based discrimination, indicating that employers do not 
increase their forecasts of good-looking workers’ productivity to raise workers’ wages when 
forecasts are highly relevant for wages. Rosenblat (2008) conducts a dictator game experiment 
and finds that taste-based discrimination in favor of physically attractive subjects is only pre-
sent when dictators are provided with both a photo and a recorded speech of the receiver. 
Photos alone do not induce subjects to be more altruistic toward good-looking co-players. 
However, there are at least three arguments for why preference-based discrimination is a 
relevant factor in my experimental setting. First, the maximum opportunity costs of staying 
out of the market can be easily calculated by participants. Second, the option which favors the 
co-player is also the safe one. Subjects may use that as an internal justification for their be-
havior. In the labor market experiment of Mobius and Rosenblat (2006), employers would have 
been suffering from cognitive dissonance if they had favored good-looking workers because 
doing so would have required an intentional misjudgment of the latter’s productivity. Third, 
the participants of my experiment are equally endowed with information. Each participant is 
shown a photo of her or his co-player, knowing that the co-player is being provided with a 
photo analogously. Moreover, after the conclusion of the experiment, all players’ decisions are 
revealed to the respective co-players. Thus, responsibility of decisions can be clearly assigned 
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to a specific person. Individuals, who typically care about how they are perceived by others, 
may take this into consideration. In this regard, my study contrasts with the dictator game 
experiment of Rosenblat (2008) in which receivers do not get to know dictators at all. Taken 
together, I conclude: 
Hypothesis 3: Physically attractive subjects face fewer entries in the market entry game 
because their co-players want to do them a favor by staying out of the market. 
This effect especially applies to the case of males facing female co-players.  
4 Methods 
4.1 Experimental Design 
The experiment consists of three independent parts which are completed in the same order by 
all participants of the experiment. Subjects are told at the beginning of the experiment that 
they will be compensated for only one of the first two parts and that the part to be remunerated 
will be drawn by lot at the very end of the experiment. Throughout the entire experiment, 
payoffs are calculated in experimental currency units (ECUs). One ECU is equal to one Euro. 
In the first part, subjects’ non-strategic risk attitudes are elicited by means of a multiple 
price list containing nine rows (see Table 3). In the multiple price list, each row represents a 
decision problem including two options between which subjects have to choose, a certain payoff 
and a lottery. Whereas the lottery remains equal across rows, the certain payoff increases from 
row to row. Risk preferences can be compared between individuals by considering the number 
of lotteries chosen, under the assumption that subjects switch only once from the lottery to 
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the certain payoff. An increase in the number of chosen lotteries indicates a decrease in risk 
aversion. Before subjects answer the multiple price list, they are provided with further payoff 
information. More precisely, they are informed that if the first part of the experiment is chosen 
for payoff, only one of the nine decisions will be remunerated and that the decision to be 
remunerated will be chosen by lot at the end of the experiment. 
>>> Insert Table 3 about here <<< 
In the second part of the experiment, subjects take part in the two-player market entry 
game presented in Section 2. In total, subjects sequentially play five rounds of the game. To 
avoid learning effects within the market entry game and biased behavior in the subsequent 
part of the experiment, the outcomes of all five rounds (as mentioned above) are only disclosed 
to participants at the very end of the experiment. In each round, each subject is randomly 
paired with another one. Besides pairings, rounds differ in a second aspect. In the first round, 
subjects are not given any information about their co-players. They are only told that they 
will be randomly matched with another participant and that co-players’ identity will not be 
revealed at any time of the experiment. This point is notable because subjects might wonder 
whether the photo taken at the beginning of the experiment might play a role in this part of 
the experiment or later. From the second to the fifth round, each subject is provided with a 
photo of her or his co-player’s face before she or he makes a decision. The photos were taken 
before the beginning of the experiment. I conduct the first round under complete anonymity 
to elicit subjects’ willingness to take strategic risk, irrespective of co-players’ characteristics. 
Apart from the varying amount of given information, each round of the market entry 
game follows the same procedure. First, subjects make their market entry decisions. Second, 
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they are asked to predict their co-players’ decision and to state their confidence with respect 
to their prediction on a ten-point Likert scale. I elicit individual confidence levels in order to 
find out whether subjects expect co-players to apply mixed strategies, as described above. To 
be more precise, I believe that low confidence levels indicate an expectation of mixed strategies. 
I expect a weaker relationship between subjects’ beliefs about their co-players’ behavior and 
their own market entry decisions in the case of low confidence levels than in the case of high 
confidence levels. 
If the second part of the experiment is chosen for payoff, only one of the five market 
entry decisions and only one of the five predictions are actually remunerated. Both decision 
and prediction are drawn by lot at the very end of the experiment. In the market entry game, 
subjects are paid according to the payoff matrix presented in Table 1. In order to avoid any 
net losses from the entry decision, each subject is initially endowed with 5.00 ECUs. A correct 
prediction of a co-player’s decision yields 2.00 ECUs. In order to prevent subjects from hedging 
the risk associated with their market entry decision through their statement of beliefs, the 
drawing procedure does not allow decisions and predictions to be drawn from the same round. 
Subjects are informed about this constraint, without making explicit mention of the underlying 
reasons. In Section 5.1, I discuss in more detail why hedging does not seem to play a role in 
my experiment. 
In the third part of the experiment, subjects are shown pictures of all other subjects’ 
faces and are asked to rate their attractiveness on a ten-point Likert scale. Moreover, I ask 
subjects whether they know the person in the photo. Subjects are told that their ratings con-
cerning co-players’ attractiveness will not be disclosed among participants in order to allow an 
unbiased elicitation of preferences. In this vein, I obtain n − 1 attractiveness ratings per subject, 
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assuming that n subjects participate in each session. Subjects are not remunerated for their 
evaluation of co-players’ attractiveness. Individual attractiveness ratings are considered in Sec-
tion 6 to test the robustness of my results. 
4.2 Procedures 
The experiment was conducted in the experimental laboratory of a large German university, 
using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Subjects were recruited via ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). I con-
ducted two sessions with 28 subjects per session, obtaining 56 participants in total. Overall, 30 
female and 26 male subjects took part in the experiment. In both sessions, 15 females and 13 
males showed up. The well-balanced sex-ratio in both sessions might have prevented subjects 
from expecting gender composition to be a relevant factor in the first round of the market 
entry game. 
Upon arrival, participants were informed that a digital photo of their face would be taken 
before the beginning of the experiment and that their photo would be shown to other partici-
pants in the following experiment. Further details of the experiment were not disclosed. More-
over, participants were told that the photos would be used for research purpose only. All 
subjects accepted these conditions and had their portrait taken in a separated part of the 
laboratory, in front of a plain-colored wall. Before the photos were actually taken, subjects 
were asked to look straight into the camera with a neutral facial expression and a closed mouth. 
Photos were re-taken if subjects smiled or kept their eyes shut. 
At the beginning of the experiment, subjects were provided with instructions covering 
the first part (elicitation of risk preferences) and the first round of the second part (market 
entry game). Subjects were told that the first part of the experiment was to be kept anonymous. 
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The instructions for the subsequent four rounds were distributed after subjects had completed 
the first round. Subjects were informed that the decisions they would make in the four subse-
quent rounds would be revealed to their counterparts at the end of the experiment. Sessions 
lasted about 45 minutes. Payments were made in cash in a separate room immediately after 
the experiment. Anonymity among subjects was ensured during the payment procedure. 
5 Results 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
In the first part of the experiment, subjects’ non-strategic risk preferences were elicited by 
means of a multiple price list. On average, subjects chose the lottery 3.70 times before switching 
to the certain payoff (see Table 4). This number indicates slight risk aversion, since the certain 
payoff equals the expected value of the lottery only in the fifth row of the multiple price list 
(see Table 4). I do not encounter any subject who switched from the lottery to the certain 
payoff, and vice versa, more than once. An independent-samples t-test is conducted to compare 
the number of chosen lotteries for females (M = 3.67, SD = 1.63) and males 
(M = 3.73, SD = 1.29). The test does not reveal statistical differences in risk-taking behavior 
between females and males (t(54) = 0.56, p = 0.580). 
>>> Insert Table 4 about here <<< 
In the second part of the experiment, subjects played five subsequent rounds of the 
market entry game. In the first round, 53.6 % of all subjects predicted that the anonymous co-
player would enter the market (see Table 5). The actual market entry rate was 67.9 %. Thus, 
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subjects tended to underestimate the actual market entry rate on average. However, a 
McNemar test does not suggest a statistically significant difference between predictions and 
actual decisions (χ2(1, N = 56) = 2.29, p = 0.190). On average, females expected a higher 
number of market entries than males did in the anonymous round. According to a Fisher’s 
exact test, this difference is not statistically significant (p = 0.421). Compared to the first 
round, both the predicted market entry rate and the actual market entry rate decreased in the 
subsequent four rounds. The predicted market entry rate decreased from 53.6 to 47.8 %, 
whereas the actual market entry rate fell from 67.9 to 58.8 %. Additional McNemar tests 
suggest that only the decrease of the rate of actual decisions is statistically significant 
(χ2(1, N = 224) = 5.38, p < 0.05). 
>>> Insert Table 5 about here <<< 
The experiment was designed in a manner that would prevent subjects from hedging the 
risk associated with their market entry decisions through their statement of beliefs. Note that 
the market entry decision and the prediction, which are remunerated if the second part of the 
experiment is chosen for payoff, are not drawn from the same round. However, it can be argued 
that subjects still have the possibility to hedge by choosing the same option in the decision 
task (e.g. to enter the market) and the “opposite” option (e.g. to predict co-player to enter the 
market) in the prediction task in each round. I believe that this is not an issue, because I do 
not encounter any subject who did not vary her or his behavior in the market entry game, 
either in the decision or in the prediction task. 
As mentioned in the introduction, subjects’ facial attractiveness scores are obtained from 
an application for mobile devices (nFace), which computes a facial beauty score on a scale 
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between 0 (lowest) and 10 (highest), based on a person’s facial geometry. In this manner, basic 
insights from psychology which emphasize the positive relationship between facial symmetry 
and perceived attractiveness of individuals are taken into account. According to an independent 
samples t-test, attractiveness scores computed by nFace do not significantly differ 
(t(54) = 0.053, p = 0.958) between females (M = 7.027, SD = 1.079) and males 
(M = 7.192, SD = 0.911). 
5.2 Stereotype-Based Decision Making 
In this section, I discuss whether decision making in the two-player entry game is driven by 
beauty stereotypes, as pointed out in Section 3.1. Formally speaking, I examine whether co-
players’ appearance affects subjects’ decision making indirectly through the mediation of be-
liefs. The analysis of the potential indirect effect consists of two steps. First, I investigate 
whether co-players’ appearance affects subjects at the level of beliefs formation (Condition 1). 
Second, I examine whether beliefs influence subjects at the level of actual decision making 
when controlling for co-players’ appearance (Condition 2). Note that the two conditions are 
derived from the causal steps method developed by Baron and Kenny (1986). If both conditions 
are fulfilled, the statistical significance of the indirect effect is tested.  
As outlined in Section 3.1, I hypothesize that subjects form their beliefs based on beauty 
stereotypes related to risk preferences, expecting attractive subjects to enter the market with 
a higher probability (Hypothesis 1). According to Hypothesis 2, this effect may interact with 
gender because gender itself may be an important source of stereotypes in the context of the 
market entry game. More precisely, gender may serve as a “first-order” stereotype which over-
lays the attractiveness stereotype. Thus, I expect the effect of attractiveness to be dampened 
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or even not to be observable when gender enables anti-coordination in the market entry game. 
Specifically, I hypothesize that this condition is satisfied in mixed-sex settings, where females 
are expected to stay out of the market while males are expected to enter. 
To study beliefs formation, I run probit regressions with subjects’ predictions of co-play-
ers’ decision as dependent variable (see Table 6). I include decision makers’ attractiveness and 
co-players’ attractiveness as explanatory variables in the regressions. Decision makers’ attrac-
tiveness is taken into account to examine whether subjects expect appearance to be meaningful 
in terms of a coordination device or whether they use it as a proxy for others’ preferences. To 
identify potential effects of gender matching (Hypothesis 2), I run regressions for the whole 
sample as well as for nine different subsamples, varying decision makers’ sex only (see Regres-
sions 2 and 3 in Table 6), co-players’ sex only (Regressions 4 and 5), and both parties’ sex 
(Regressions 6 to 9). In Regression 10, I consider same-sex dyads only. 
>>> Insert Table 6 about here <<< 
By including subjects’ predictions of anonymous co-players’ behavior in the models, I 
account for subjects’ beliefs concerning others’ strategic risk preferences, irrespective of indi-
vidual characteristics. Furthermore, I control for decision makers’ financial risk attitude (de-
rived from the multiple price list) and for the age of decision makers and co-players. Age may 
be a driver for both expectations and decision making, because according to dual process theory 
presented in Section 3.2, age may help subjects to categorize others at the first stage of judg-
ment. In this aspect, age may exercise the same function as gender. Moreover, age may be 
related to the perceived attractiveness of others. However, I do not expect age to be crucial in 
my experiment, because participants were relatively homogeneous in terms of their age. 
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According to Hypotheses 1 and 2, I expect co-players’ attractiveness to be relevant in 
the cases of same-sex matching, i.e. in Regressions 6, 9, and 10. Regression analysis provides 
partial support for this conjecture: The coefficient of co-players’ attractiveness is statistically 
significant in the case of females facing female co-players only (see Regression 6). The direction 
of the effect indicates that females expect physically attractive females to enter the market 
with a higher likelihood. The pseudo R-squared of Regression 6 is the highest one compared to 
the other regressions, which underlines the explanatory power of co-players’ appearance in this 
case. Thus, Condition 1 is satisfied for the case of females facing female co-players. Note that 
the models reported in Table 6 do not reveal any significant predictors other than the variables 
related to attractiveness, which also illustrates the importance of attractiveness at the level of 
beliefs formation.  
As outlined above, an indirect effect of co-players’ appearance additionally requires be-
liefs to be predictive for market entry decisions when controlling for co-players’ appearance 
(Condition 2). To test whether this condition is fulfilled, I perform another set of probit re-
gressions for the whole sample and different subsamples (see Table 7). In each model, the 
actual market entry decision is considered as the independent variable. In addition to co-
players’ appearance, I include decision makers’ financial risk attitude, their decisions made in 
the anonymous round,  their stated confidence, their own attractiveness, and the age of decision 
makers and co-players as explanatory variables. For each model presented in Table 7, including 
the case of females facing female co-players, the effect of “prediction” on market entry decisions 
is statistically significant: The expectation that the co-player will enter the market lowers 
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subjects’ willingness to enter the market, and vice versa.2 Thus, both conditions indicating an 
indirect effect of co-players’ appearance on market entry decisions are satisfied for the case of 
females facing female co-players. 
>>> Insert Table 7 about here <<< 
Finally, I examine whether the indirect effect is statistically significant. In linear regres-
sion models, the coefficient of an indirect effect can be computed by multiplying the coefficients 
of the partial effects. Since I carry out non-linear regression models, the coefficients of the 
partial effects are in different scales and have to be standardized before multiplying them 
(Kenny, 2013; MacKinnon & Dwyer, 1993; Singh, 1993). The significance of the indirect effect 
is tested by means of non-parametric bootstrapping using 10,000 resamples (Preacher & Hayes, 
2004). The 95 % bias-corrected confidence interval for the indirect effect ranges from -0.40 to 
-0.06. As this interval does not include zero, the indirect effect is statistically significant. Thus, 
Hypothesis 1 cannot be rejected for the case of females facing female co-players. As these 
findings do not apply to mixed-sex dyads, Hypothesis 2, which suggests a difference between 
same-sex and mixed-sex dyads, is partially confirmed. 
Up to this point, I have found that subjects are affected by co-players’ appearance 
through stereotypes under specific conditions. As outlined earlier in this paper, subjects may 
also expect their own appearance to affect co-players’ behavior, via stereotypes or appearance-
related preferences. Previous regressions suggest that this does apply to females who face male 
 
2 This finding is notable, because subjects seem to behave in a “rational” manner, which may be an 
indicator for the application of pure strategies. If subjects applied mixed strategies, beliefs would not 
be relevant for decision making. 
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co-players (see Regression 7 in Table 6): Females rated as good-looking expect male counter-
parts to enter the market with a lower likelihood. Bootstrapping using 10,000 resamples indi-
cates that the indirect effect of females’ own appearance on their market entry decisions is 
statistically significant (bias-correcting bootstrapping 95 % confidence interval [0.03, 0.36]). 
Thus, females map their stereotype-based beliefs into actual decisions. I cannot clearly disen-
tangle whether females’ expectations refer to stereotype-based or preference-based behavior of 
males. However, my analysis shows that males’ beliefs do not rely on beauty stereotypes at all 
(see Regressions 8 and 9 in Table 6). Interestingly, females do not expect their own appearance 
to affect other females. Hence, females stereotype each other based on appearance, but they do 
not correctly anticipate being stereotyped. 
To complete my analysis of stereotype-based decision making, I study potential interac-
tions between subjects’ own appearance and co-players’ appearance at the level of beliefs for-
mation. For this purpose, I compute the difference between decision makers’ and co-players’ 
attractiveness score for each pair and include it as additional explanatory variable in the re-
gressions. The respective results presented in Table 8 suggest that the difference of attractive-
ness scores does not affect beliefs formation. Apparently, subjects do not make use of appear-
ance as a coordination device, as they do not rely on co-players’ appearance in relation to their 
own appearance, and vice versa. 
>>> Insert Table 8 about here <<< 
In the present section, I have focused on the question of whether decision making in the 
two-player market entry game is affected by beauty stereotypes related to risk preferences. My 
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analysis provides partial support for Hypotheses 1 and 2. Findings indicating a beauty stereo-
type are limited to the case of females facing female co-players. Corresponding to Hypothesis 1, 
I observe that females expect good-looking females to enter the market with a higher probabil-
ity. Additional statistical tests suggest that the beauty stereotype indirectly affects decision 
making through beliefs. Moreover, my analysis of beliefs formation reveals that females do not 
expect their own appearance to affect female co-players but do expect it to affect male ones. 
5.3 Preference-Based Decision Making 
In this section, I examine whether decision making in the two-player market entry is driven by 
preferences related to others’ appearance and whether potential preference-based behavior in-
teracts with subjects’ own appearance. To this end, I first refer to the regressions shown in 
Table 7, where the actual market entry decision is considered as the dependent variable. Since 
I intend to identify a direct effect of appearance on decision making which is not mediated by 
players’ beliefs, it is important that beliefs are controlled for. 
Regression analysis indicates that co-players’ attractiveness is relevant in the case of 
males facing female co-players (see Regression 7 in Table 7), which is in line with Hypothesis 3: 
Males refrain from entering the market when facing good-looking female co-players. Interest-
ingly, this finding coincides with females’ expectations, which have been discussed in the pre-
vious section. Good-looking females correctly anticipate that they will face fewer entries from 
males than less attractive females do (see Regression 7 in Table 6). Note that in contrast to 
co-players’ appearance, subjects’ own appearance does not influence decision making in any of 
the subsamples when controlling for predictions. 
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Corresponding to my previous analysis of beliefs formation, I run another set of regres-
sions to identify potential interaction effects between subjects’ and co-players’ attractiveness 
score. Again, I include the difference of attractiveness scores instead of the two separate at-
tractiveness variables. The results presented in Table 9 suggest that decision makers’ and co-
players’ appearance interact only with each other in the case of males facing female co-players 
(see Regression 8). According to the previous finding of males favoring good-looking females 
over less attractive ones, I observe that the greater the difference of attractiveness, the higher 
is the likelihood of a market entry. 
>>> Insert Table 9 about here <<< 
In summary, the current section shows that co-players’ appearance affects decision mak-
ing through a preference-based channel in the case of males facing female co-players. Female 
attractiveness lowers male willingness to enter the market. As I control for beliefs (revealing 
that male decision makers do not expect attractive female co-players ceteris paribus to enter 
more often), I can clearly identify preferences as the underlying cause. Moreover, I find that 
decision makers’ and co-players’ attractiveness interact with each other in the case of males 
facing female co-players. The lower co-players’ attractiveness score compared to males’ own 
attractiveness score, the higher is the probability that the latter will enter the market. 
6 Robustness Checks 
To test the robustness of the previous results, I reproduce my analyses using an alternative 
measure of attractiveness. Instead of the attractiveness ratings computed by nFace (symmetry 
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measure), I consider the individual attractiveness ratings obtained from the third part of the 
experiment (survey measure). To ensure comparability between subjects in terms of their at-
tractiveness ratings given for others, the latter are first standardized within subjects. Second, 
the mean of all ratings which a participant has received from other participants is computed. 
In order to obtain unbiased judgments, I exclude ratings from further analysis if raters have 
stated that they knew the target person. Females (M = 0.21, SD = 0.72) got higher ratings 
than males (M = -0.24, SD = 0.51) did (see Table 4). An independent samples t-test shows 
that the difference between females and males in attractiveness scores is statistically significant 
(t(54) = 2.487, p < 0.05). In line with the literature, the facial symmetry scores obtained from 
nFace on the one hand and the individual attractiveness ratings on the other hand are moder-
ately correlated on the overall level (r = 0.309, p < 0.05). Rhodes et al. (1998) report correla-
tion coefficients between 0.27 and 0.43. In contrast to Rhodes et al. (1998), correlations differ 
substantially between females (r = 0.460, p < 0.05) and males (r = 0.063, p = 0.761) in my 
sample. If I control for age, the correlation coefficient for males increases to 0.219. However, 
the correlation is not statistically significant (p = 0.292). As my main results refer solely to 
female appearance, I do not expect this artefact to be crucial for further analysis. 
Corresponding to Section 5, I first focus on stereotype-based behavior. Regression 6 in 
Table 10 confirms that females expect good-looking female co-players to enter the market with 
a higher likelihood compared to less attractive females. Regression 6 in Table 11 suggests that 
there is also a statistically significant negative relationship between beliefs and decisions when 
controlling for co-players’ appearance. Thus, Conditions 1 and 2 are both satisfied. According 
to a bootstrapping procedure using 10,000 resamples, the indirect effect of co-players’ appear-
ance on market entry decisions is statistically significant (bias-correcting bootstrapping 95 % 
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confidence interval [-0.34, -0.03]). In addition to the indirect effect, I have previously found 
that females expect their own appearance to affect male co-players’ behavior. However, I cannot 
reproduce this finding when using the survey measure (see Regression 7 in Table 10). Moreover, 
I do not observe any interaction effects with regard to attractiveness at the level of beliefs 
formation (see Table 12). 
>>> Insert Tables 10, 11, and 12 about here <<< 
My previous analysis suggests preference-based behavior in the case of males facing fe-
male co-players. This main finding is confirmed by Regression 8 in Table 11. The respective 
regression also reveals an additional result which has not been observed in the previous analy-
sis: Good-looking males avoid market entry when the co-player is female. Therefore, the inter-
action effect reported in Section 5 disappears (see Regressions 8 in Tables 9 and 13). This 
finding may be interpreted in terms of taste-based discrimination theory: Good-looking males 
may be aware of their appearance and may have experienced their appearance being rewarded 
in social interactions. Put another way, good-looking males may expect to derive a higher 
“social” utility from staying out of the market than others. Although this finding seems to be 
in line with intuition and theory, it is not robust, since it cannot be observed when using the 
symmetry measure. One may speculate that this lack of robustness may be related to the 
inconsistency of attractiveness measures for males reported above. 
>>> Insert Table 13 about here <<< 
The present section is intended to test the robustness of my results by means of an 
alternative attractiveness measure. Reproducing my analyses from Section 5 provides further 
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evidence for the main results. On the one hand, I identify stereotype-based decision making in 
female dyads. Females expect good-looking females to take more strategic risk and the former 
behave rationally with regard to this belief. On the other hand, I observe preference-based 
behavior in the case of males facing female co-players: Males demonstrate favor to good-looking 
females by not entering the market. The finding that females correctly anticipate the prefer-
ence-based behavior of males cannot be confirmed. 
7 Conclusion 
In this paper, I report results from a two-person market entry game with disclosed appearances 
to examine the relevance of attractiveness and gender for the willingness to take strategic risk. 
I find that appearance operates through both of the transmission channels which have been 
previously proposed in the literature. I observe both stereotype-based and preference-based 
behavior, depending on how sexes are matched. At the level of beliefs formation, I observe a 
stereotype that relates beauty to strategic risk-taking behavior. Female subjects expect good-
looking females to enter the market more often than less attractive females. I argue that this 
finding is due to the fact that information on gender does not help subjects to coordinate in 
same-sex settings. 
Actual market entry decisions are affected by appearance in two ways. As subjects 
strongly rely on their beliefs when making decisions, the beauty effect is also observable on the 
level of decisions, but limited to the case of females facing female co-players. Moreover, I 
provide evidence for preference-based behavior in the case of males facing female co-players. In 
line with taste-based discrimination theory and basic implications from evolutionary biology, 
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men seem to demonstrate favor to physically attractive women by refraining from market 
entry. I speculate that males intend to prevent good-looking females from monetary loss that 
would occur in the case of a simultaneous market entry. On the other hand, males might want 
to signal to females that they are not taking advantage of the circumstances that favor males 
in a mixed-sex dyad. A third result is that subjects take into account their own appearance 
only to a limited extent. Females rated as good-looking expect their appearance to lower males’ 
willingness to enter the market, thereby correctly anticipating males’ behavior. Note that this 
finding disappears when attractiveness is not determined according to facial symmetry but 
according to the assessment of all participants in the experiment. In female dyads, subjects’ 
own appearance does not affect beliefs. This finding suggests that subjects do not use appear-
ance as a coordination device. 
The finding that the effects of attractiveness interact with gender corresponds to previous 
studies suggesting that men change their behavior when interacting with physically attractive 
women (e.g. Bertrand et al., 2010; Darai & Grätz, 2013; Dreber et al., 2013; Landry et al., 
2006). However, the present study is the first one which explicitly shows that the interaction 
between appearance and behavior may take place at both levels – the level of beliefs formation 
and the level of actual decision making – and that the interaction varies with respect to these 
levels. Moreover, I demonstrate that the beauty stereotype observed in non-strategic contexts 
may also apply to strategic interactions, especially to competitive environments. Besides these 
contributions, my research raises questions that deserve further investigation. Most im-
portantly, future research should address the question of why subjects who rely on a certain 
stereotype when forming beliefs do not anticipate that their counterparts’ beliefs might be 
affected by the same stereotype. 
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As outlined at the very beginning, the findings from my study can be transferred to real 
world situations in which individuals have to decide whether to compete for a scarce resource 
that cannot be shared equally among them. Moreover, it is required that the bilateral decision 
to compete – the failure of coordination – causes harm to competitors. In entrepreneurship, 
firms often face the problem of whether to enter a new market. Under the condition of limited 
demand, excessive market entries may cause price wars that finally ruin all entrants. However, 
my research focusses rather on individuals than on organizations. Therefore, the implications 
from my study are probably better suited to the labor market, where employees have to decide 
frequently whether to compete with others, e.g. for a leadership position. Competition may 
especially harm employees if the expected gains from winning the competition are low. For 
instance, competition may cause disutility to competitors if a third party takes advantage of 
the situation. This phenomenon is common in the field of politics, e.g. when the opposition 
gains popularity just because the governing parties are involved in ongoing conflicts with each 
other.  
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Tables 
  Player B  
  Stay Out Enter  
Player A 
Stay Out (0, 0) (0, 3.5)  
Enter (3.5, 0) (-3.5, -3.5)  
Table 1: Two-player market entry game 
  Player B  
  Yield Drive On  
Player A 
Yield (0, 0) (-1, 1)  
Drive On (1, -1) (-10, -10)  
Table 2: Game of chicken  
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Decision Option A Option B Your Choice 
1 win 5.00 or nothing get 0.50 for sure A or B 
2 win 5.00 or nothing get 1.00 for sure A or B 
3 win 5.00 or nothing get 1.50 for sure A or B 
4 win 5.00 or nothing get 2.00 for sure A or B 
5 win 5.00 or nothing get 2.50 for sure A or B 
6 win 5.00 or nothing get 3.00 for sure A or B 
7 win 5.00 or nothing get 3.50 for sure A or B 
8 win 5.00 or nothing get 4.00 for sure A or B 
9 win 5.00 or nothing get 4.50 for sure A or B 
Table 3: Multiple price list 
  
  
76 
 
Variable M Lowest Highest SD 
Age 
 of Females 
 of Males 
24.70 
24.07 
25.42 
19 
19 
19 
45 
34 
45 
4.30 
3.40 
5.07 
Number of Lotteries Chosen 
 by Females 
 by Males 
3.70 
3.67 
3.73 
0 
0 
0 
7 
7 
7 
1.48 
1.63 
1.30 
Attractiveness (Symmetry Measure) 
 of Females 
 of Males 
7.01 
7.00 
7.02 
4.40 
4.40 
5.60 
9.00 
9.00 
8.80 
1.09 
1.21 
0.95 
Attractiveness (Survey Measure) 
 of Females 
 of Males 
0.01 
0.21 
-0.24 
-1.35 
-1.35 
-1.19 
1.66 
1.66 
0.81 
0.67 
0.72 
0.51 
M: Mean, SD: Standard Deviation 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics 
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Sex of Decision Maker Sex of Co-Player 
Anonymous Non-Anonymous 
Predicted Actual Predicted Actual 
Female Female   39.1 67.2 
 Male   62.5 57.1 
 Both 60.0 67.9 50.0 62.5 
Male Female   33.9 62.5 
 Male   58.3 41.7 
 Both 46.2 67.9 45.2 52.9 
Both Female   36.7 65.0 
 Male   60.6 50.0 
 Both 53.6 67.9 47.8 58.8 
Table 5: Frequencies of predicted and actual market entries 
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Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Dependent Variable: 
Predicted Market Entry Decision 
(1 = Entry) 
All Female Male Female Co-Player
Male 
Co-Player
Female vs. 
Female 
Female vs. 
Male 
Male vs.
Female 
Male vs. 
Male Same Sex 
Financial Risk Attitude 0.017 -0.048 0.111 0.039 0.009 -0.104 0.025 0.282 -0.014 -0.054 
 (0.042) (0.052) (0.067) (0.072) (0.087) (0.082) (0.128) (0.160) (0.123) (0.070) 
Anonymous Prediction (1 = Entry) 0.141 0.120 0.074 0.248 0.153 0.177 0.242 0.422 -0.221 -0.137 
(0.147) (0.216) (0.203) (0.276) (0.272) (0.401) (0.384) (0.346) (0.432) (0.281) 
Attractiveness -0.035 -0.074 -0.019 0.137 -0.256 0.116 -0.342* -0.039 0.008 0.137 
(0.068) (0.094) (0.137) (0.106) (0.136) (0.135) (0.174) (0.188) (0.261) (0.129) 
Attractiveness of Co-Player 0.109 0.186 0.043 0.212* -0.125 0.430** -0.338 0.043 0.100 0.267* 
(0.078) (0.102) (0.124) (0.108) (0.138) (0.164) (0.217) (0.151) (0.220) (0.123) 
Age 0.019 -0.001 0.024 -0.006 0.048 -0.054 0.088 -0.001 0.050 0.026 
 (0.012) (0.024) (0.017) (0.020) (0.034) (0.046) (0.057) (0.021) (0.045) (0.027) 
Age of Co-Player -0.001 0.005 -0.009 -0.029 -0.009 -0.019 0.023 -0.028 -0.032 -0.016 
 (0.021) (0.031) (0.029) (0.035) (0.026) (0.039) (0.037) (0.062) (0.038) (0.026) 
Constant -1.190 -0.815 -1.135 -2.296 1.840 -2.206 2.171 -1.033 -0.849 -2.899 
(1.046) (1.513) (1.625) (1.556) (1.840) (2.348) (2.729) (2.319) (2.874) (1.627) 
Number of Observations 222 118 104 118 104 62 56 56 48 110 
Number of Subjects 56 30 26 56 56 30 30 26 26 56 
Pseudo R-squared 0.018 0.025 0.018 0.056 0.054 0.143 0.140 0.063 0.032 0.052 
Probit regression with robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the individual level 
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
Table 6: Determinants of predictions (symmetry measure) 
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Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Dependent Variable: 
Market Entry Decision (1 = Entry) All Female Male 
Female 
Co-Player 
Male 
Co-Player 
Female vs. 
Female 
Female vs. 
Male 
Male vs. 
Female 
Male vs. 
Male Same Sex 
Prediction (1 = Entry) -1.240*** -1.303*** -1.581*** -1.056*** -1.381*** -1.373** -1.421** -1.448** -1.903*** -1.424*** 
(0.224) (0.280) (0.378) (0.300) (0.329) (0.421) (0.485) (0.459) (0.525) (0.312) 
Financial Risk Attitude 0.018 -0.044 0.081 0.122 -0.113 0.059 -0.206 0.020 0.111 0.057 
(0.053) (0.069) (0.118) (0.088) (0.089) (0.102) (0.111) (0.351) (0.177) (0.071) 
Anonymous Decision (1 = Entry) 0.492* 0.422 0.572 0.177 0.834** 0.157 0.638 -0.295 1.583** 0.665 
(0.251) (0.397) (0.354) (0.335) (0.303) (0.509) (0.485) (0.578) (0.575) (0.343) 
Attractiveness 0.037 0.003 0.037 0.034 0.035 -0.066 0.069 0.071 -0.052 -0.008 
 (0.130) (0.184) (0.227) (0.152) (0.143) (0.214) (0.170) (0.230) (0.338) (0.169) 
Attractiveness of Co-Player -0.044 0.209 -0.348* -0.084 -0.068 0.252 0.085 -0.498* -0.516 0.101 
 (0.093) (0.128) (0.153) (0.107) (0.158) (0.148) (0.266) (0.239) (0.264) (0.120) 
Age 0.026 -0.001 0.044 0.096* -0.026 0.023 -0.029 0.265* -0.038 -0.012 
 (0.020) (0.046) (0.023) (0.047) (0.027) (0.064) (0.066) (0.119) (0.037) (0.029) 
Age of Co-Player -0.004 0.018 -0.029 -0.031 0.010 -0.040 0.053 -0.038 -0.016 -0.039 
(0.021) (0.030) (0.026) (0.032) (0.031) (0.039) (0.049) (0.058) (0.047) (0.026) 
Confidence 0.087 0.074 0.110 0.126 0.049 0.151 -0.002 0.233 0.143 0.099 
 (0.052) (0.076) (0.078) (0.072) (0.067) (0.102) (0.108) (0.170) (0.111) (0.073) 
Constant -0.542 -1.417 1.318 -1.659 1.050 -1.016 -0.251 -2.868 3.930 0.244 
(1.362) (2.571) (1.885) (1.776) (1.806) (2.696) (3.116) (2.993) (2.820) (1.809) 
Number of Observations 222 118 104 118 104 62 56 56 48 110 
Number of Subjects 56 30 26 56 56 30 30 26 26 56 
Pseudo R-squared 0.173 0.187 0.245 0.173 0.230 0.203 0.234 0.327 0.328 0.233 
Probit regression with robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the individual level 
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
Table 7: Determinants of market entry decisions (symmetry measure)  
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Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Dependent Variable: 
Predicted Market Entry Decision 
(1 = Entry) 
All Female Male Female Co-Player
Male 
Co-Player
Female vs. 
Female 
Female vs. 
Male 
Male vs.
Female 
Male vs. 
Male Same Sex 
Financial Risk Attitude 0.021 -0.047 0.114 0.064 -0.002 -0.072 0.038 0.282 -0.003 -0.025 
 (0.042) (0.051) (0.062) (0.071) (0.087) (0.086) (0.133) (0.159) (0.115) (0.071) 
Anonymous Prediction (1 = Entry) 0.163 0.137 0.085 0.349 0.042 0.245 0.185 0.424 -0.168 -0.014 
(0.154) (0.221) (0.213) (0.280) (0.274) (0.414) (0.392) (0.355) (0.410) (0.282) 
Difference of Attractiveness Scores -0.073 -0.126 -0.034 -0.054 -0.080 -0.142 -0.067 -0.041 -0.052 -0.071 
(0.049) (0.073) (0.073) (0.075) (0.090) (0.104) (0.128) (0.111) (0.151) (0.086) 
Age 0.018 -0.004 0.024 -0.014 0.049 -0.073 0.082 -0.001 0.050 0.020 
(0.012) (0.024) (0.017) (0.020) (0.034) (0.043) (0.059) (0.021) (0.045) (0.026) 
Age of Co-Player -0.002 0.002 -0.009 -0.042 -0.009 -0.051 0.022 -0.028 -0.032 -0.021 
 (0.021) (0.030) (0.029) (0.036) (0.026) (0.036) (0.042) (0.062) (0.039) (0.027) 
Constant -0.644 0.094 -0.978 0.550 -0.750 2.749* -2.477 -1.007 -0.161 0.035 
 (0.631) (0.944) (0.827) (1.063) (1.102) (1.369) (2.108) (1.824) (1.300) (0.859) 
Number of Observations 222 118 104 118 104 62 56 56 48 110 
Number of Subjects 56 30 26 56 56 30 30 26 26 56 
Pseudo R-squared 0.010 0.021 0.018 0.025 0.027 0.060 0.052 0.063 0.031 0.012 
Probit regression with robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the individual level 
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
Table 8: Determinants of predictions and interaction of attractiveness scores (symmetry measure)  
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Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Dependent Variable: 
Market Entry Decision (1 = Entry) All Female Male 
Female 
Co-Player
Male 
Co-Player
Female vs. 
Female 
Female vs. 
Male 
Male vs.
Female 
Male vs. 
Male Same Sex 
Prediction (1 = Entry) -1.240*** -1.251*** -1.510*** -1.074*** -1.371*** -1.236** -1.481** -1.372** -1.687*** -1.385*** 
(0.224) (0.302) (0.389) (0.302) (0.328) (0.443) (0.460) (0.467) (0.506) (0.311) 
Financial Risk Attitude 0.017 -0.042 0.048 0.121 -0.113 0.068 -0.210 0.038 0.030 0.063 
(0.052) (0.067) (0.098) (0.088) (0.088) (0.102) (0.114) (0.304) (0.121) (0.068) 
Anonymous Decision (1 = Entry) 0.493* 0.348 0.484 0.184 0.830** 0.111 0.596 -0.278 1.156* 0.673* 
(0.251) (0.405) (0.351) (0.338) (0.306) (0.504) (0.496) (0.554) (0.550) (0.343) 
Difference of Attractiveness Scores 0.040 -0.088 0.215 0.059 0.050 -0.142 0.006 0.327* 0.203 -0.050 
(0.082) (0.130) (0.119) (0.097) (0.097) (0.151) (0.134) (0.153) (0.182) (0.110) 
Age 0.026 -0.004 0.041 0.097* -0.027 0.015 -0.023 0.236* -0.033 -0.014 
(0.020) (0.045) (0.024) (0.048) (0.027) (0.064) (0.066) (0.107) (0.038) (0.029) 
Age of Co-Player -0.004 0.012 -0.026 -0.030 0.010 -0.049 0.051 -0.040 -0.015 -0.039 
 (0.021) (0.028) (0.027) (0.032) (0.031) (0.038) (0.049) (0.064) (0.045) (0.026) 
Confidence 0.087 0.081 0.090 0.124 0.048 0.155 0.004 0.169 0.108 0.098 
 (0.052) (0.083) (0.077) (0.071) (0.066) (0.106) (0.106) (0.145) (0.105) (0.073) 
Constant -0.591 0.265 -0.590 -2.060 0.831 0.607 0.762 -4.847 0.509 0.908 
(0.843) (1.698) (0.932) (1.467) (1.151) (1.827) (2.541) (2.908) (1.725) (1.097) 
Number of Observations 222 118 104 118 104 62 56 56 48 110 
Number of Subjects 56 30 26 56 56 30 30 26 26 56 
Pseudo R-squared 0.173 0.177 0.231 0.173 0.230 0.195 0.230 0.304 0.300 0.232 
Probit regression with robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the individual level 
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
Table 9: Determinants of market entry decisions and interaction of attractiveness scores (symmetry measure)  
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Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Dependent Variable: 
Predicted Market Entry Decision 
(1 = Entry) 
All Female Male Female Co-Player
Male 
Co-Player
Female vs. 
Female 
Female vs. 
Male 
Male vs.
Female 
Male vs. 
Male Same Sex 
Financial Risk Attitude 0.015 -0.049 0.117 0.052 -0.008 -0.112 0.072 0.296 -0.081 -0.045 
 (0.042) (0.062) (0.071) (0.075) (0.087) (0.105) (0.137) (0.162) (0.125) (0.072) 
Anonymous Prediction (1 = Entry) 0.111 0.077 0.057 0.302 -0.006 0.104 0.058 0.355 -0.275 -0.080 
(0.157) (0.230) (0.229) (0.275) (0.270) (0.380) (0.384) (0.373) (0.395) (0.275) 
Attractiveness 0.006 0.017 0.067 0.085 -0.115 0.140 -0.191 0.254 -0.425 -0.123 
(0.173) (0.212) (0.244) (0.236) (0.233) (0.325) (0.326) (0.396) (0.421) (0.241) 
Attractiveness of Co-Player -0.016 0.140 -0.169 0.183 -0.008 0.604** -0.466 -0.143 0.610 0.365* 
(0.134) (0.147) (0.232) (0.183) (0.352) (0.230) (0.545) (0.324) (0.514) (0.186) 
Age 0.018 0.010 0.024 -0.007 0.042 -0.054 0.085 0.009 0.031 0.016 
 (0.018) (0.031) (0.021) (0.027) (0.039) (0.052) (0.063) (0.023) (0.042) (0.030) 
Age of Co-Player -0.002 0.017 -0.021 -0.033 -0.005 -0.012 -0.003 -0.046 0.001 0.004 
 (0.025) (0.033) (0.038) (0.041) (0.034) (0.038) (0.051) (0.070) (0.051) (0.030) 
Constant -0.591 -0.593 -0.674 0.173 -0.617 1.382 -2.016 -0.770 -0.120 -0.383 
(0.771) (1.127) (1.191) (1.229) (1.310) (1.556) (2.036) (1.961) (1.606) (1.013) 
Number of Observations 222 118 104 118 104 62 56 56 48 110 
Number of Subjects 56 30 26 56 56 30 30 26 26 56 
Pseudo R-squared 0.005 0.007 0.022 0.030 0.023 0.109 0.068 0.071 0.056 0.026 
Probit regression with robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the individual level 
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
Table 10: Determinants of predictions (survey measure) 
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Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Dependent Variable: 
Market Entry Decision (1 = Entry) All Female Male 
Female 
Co-Player 
Male 
Co-Player 
Female vs. 
Female 
Female vs. 
Male 
Male vs. 
Female 
Male vs. 
Male Same Sex 
Prediction (1 = Entry) -1.260*** -1.244*** -1.626*** -1.069*** -1.407*** -1.154* -1.393** -1.622*** -1.620** -1.401*** 
 (0.229) (0.303) (0.380) (0.306) (0.343) (0.452) (0.474) (0.475) (0.536) (0.335) 
Financial Risk Attitude 0.022 -0.070 0.039 0.131 -0.117 0.072 -0.256** -0.136 0.097 0.058 
(0.051) (0.073) (0.092) (0.090) (0.086) (0.112) (0.097) (0.263) (0.158) (0.080) 
Anonymous Decision (1 = Entry) 0.481 0.406 0.738* 0.198 0.824** 0.205 0.810 0.298 1.065* 0.641 
(0.256) (0.413) (0.360) (0.342) (0.313) (0.514) (0.488) (0.594) (0.502) (0.349) 
Attractiveness 0.195 0.365 -0.567 0.099 0.327 0.399 0.360 -1.484** 0.388 0.477 
 (0.189) (0.233) (0.351) (0.289) (0.234) (0.374) (0.296) (0.496) (0.672) (0.302) 
Attractiveness of Co-Player -0.082 0.142 -0.321 -0.302 0.418 -0.091 0.654 -0.617** 0.013 0.023 
 (0.140) (0.206) (0.195) (0.160) (0.345) (0.254) (0.498) (0.224) (0.635) (0.230) 
Age 0.041 0.030 0.011 0.103 -0.002 0.050 -0.015 0.137 -0.001 0.021 
 (0.021) (0.046) (0.027) (0.056) (0.028) (0.077) (0.063) (0.091) (0.034) (0.038) 
Age of Co-Player -0.008 0.035 -0.055 -0.047 0.038 -0.051 0.096 -0.017 -0.024 -0.027 
 (0.024) (0.031) (0.032) (0.036) (0.037) (0.048) (0.060) (0.060) (0.055) (0.033) 
Confidence 0.085 0.086 0.135 0.120 0.049 0.149 0.018 0.282 0.073 0.093 
 (0.053) (0.079) (0.080) (0.075) (0.068) (0.106) (0.114) (0.150) (0.104) (0.073) 
Constant -0.844 -1.190 0.473 -1.764 -0.354 -0.340 -0.642 -3.291 0.015 -0.174 
(0.872) (1.595) (1.156) (1.596) (1.370) (2.191) (2.604) (2.348) (2.043) (1.285) 
Number of Observations 222 118 104 118 104 62 56 56 48 110 
Number of Subjects 56 30 26 56 56 30 30 26 26 56 
Pseudo R-squared 0.177 0.193 0.225 0.185 0.251 0.199 0.270 0.363 0.284 0.256 
Probit regression with robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the individual level 
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
Table 11: Determinants of market entry decisions (survey measure)  
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Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Dependent Variable: 
Predicted Market Entry Decision 
(1 = Entry) 
All Female Male Female Co-Player
Male 
Co-Player
Female vs. 
Female 
Female vs. 
Male 
Male vs.
Female 
Male vs. 
Male Same Sex 
Financial Risk Attitude 0.015 -0.037 0.126 0.062 -0.010 -0.048 0.044 0.288 -0.091 -0.036 
 (0.043) (0.054) (0.064) (0.070) (0.086) (0.080) (0.135) (0.149) (0.124) (0.069) 
Anonymous Prediction (1 = Entry) 0.111 0.088 0.061 0.323 0.003 0.214 0.153 0.356 -0.286 -0.055 
(0.157) (0.228) (0.225) (0.275) (0.268) (0.396) (0.392) (0.374) (0.392) (0.274) 
Difference of Attractiveness Scores 0.011 -0.052 0.140 -0.066 -0.078 -0.234 -0.018 0.171 -0.528 -0.243 
(0.116) (0.140) (0.161) (0.151) (0.212) (0.205) (0.285) (0.259) (0.399) (0.170) 
Age 0.018 0.005 0.029 -0.020 0.044 -0.080 0.092 0.004 0.025 0.005 
(0.014) (0.026) (0.020) (0.021) (0.038) (0.046) (0.062) (0.021) (0.039) (0.027) 
Age of Co-Player -0.002 0.009 -0.018 -0.043 0.000 -0.046 0.028 -0.047 -0.005 -0.006 
 (0.023) (0.031) (0.034) (0.039) (0.028) (0.037) (0.042) (0.069) (0.043) (0.028) 
Constant -0.610 -0.309 -0.861 0.705 -0.800 2.731* -2.876 -0.592 0.181 0.108 
 (0.618) (0.939) (0.833) (1.033) (1.168) (1.339) (2.075) (1.668) (1.217) (0.826) 
Number of Observations 222 118 104 118 104 62 56 56 48 110 
Number of Subjects 56 30 26 56 56 30 30 26 26 56 
Pseudo R-squared 0.005 0.005 0.021 0.023 0.023 0.056 0.047 0.070 0.055 0.021 
Probit regression with robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the individual level 
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
Table 12: Determinants of predictions and interaction of attractiveness scores (survey measure) 
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Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Dependent Variable: 
Market Entry Decision (1 = Entry) All Female Male 
Female 
Co-Player
Male 
Co-Player
Female vs. 
Female 
Female vs. 
Male 
Male vs.
Female 
Male vs. 
Male Same Sex 
Prediction (1 = Entry) -1.259*** -1.189*** -1.489*** -1.087*** -1.382*** -1.065* -1.483** -1.375** -1.647** -1.322*** 
(0.229) (0.305) (0.373) (0.309) (0.336) (0.416) (0.468) (0.450) (0.541) (0.314) 
Financial Risk Attitude 0.024 -0.041 0.119 0.126 -0.106 0.096 -0.218* 0.178 0.075 0.075 
(0.050) (0.064) (0.097) (0.090) (0.086) (0.103) (0.108) (0.271) (0.155) (0.075) 
Anonymous Decision (1 = Entry) 0.488 0.339 0.567 0.181 0.827** 0.197 0.590 0.020 1.136* 0.696* 
(0.252) (0.420) (0.363) (0.337) (0.316) (0.512) (0.501) (0.558) (0.536) (0.344) 
Difference of Attractiveness Scores 0.137 0.141 0.105 0.217 0.085 0.244 0.082 0.194 0.142 0.232 
(0.112) (0.152) (0.175) (0.170) (0.199) (0.237) (0.221) (0.191) (0.560) (0.200) 
Age 0.035 0.014 0.053* 0.114* -0.020 0.039 -0.018 0.241* -0.016 -0.003 
(0.020) (0.043) (0.022) (0.053) (0.026) (0.070) (0.065) (0.105) (0.034) (0.032) 
Age of Co-player -0.013 0.009 -0.032 -0.040 0.002 -0.068 0.047 -0.013 -0.038 -0.050 
 (0.022) (0.031) (0.028) (0.038) (0.030) (0.049) (0.045) (0.061) (0.045) (0.031) 
Confidence 0.084 0.077 0.087 0.124 0.044 0.139 0.001 0.159 0.092 0.087 
 (0.053) (0.080) (0.077) (0.073) (0.065) (0.105) (0.104) (0.141) (0.104) (0.074) 
Constant -0.602 -0.130 -1.031 -2.210 0.865 0.315 0.750 -6.221* 0.600 0.879 
(0.821) (1.523) (0.943) (1.546) (1.146) (1.936) (2.263) (2.698) (1.759) (1.099) 
Number of Observations 222 118 104 118 104 62 56 56 48 110 
Number of Subjects 56 30 26 56 56 30 30 26 26 56 
Pseudo R-squared 0.176 0.175 0.200 0.182 0.229 0.192 0.231 0.244 0.280 0.239 
Probit regression with robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the individual level 
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
Table 13: Determinants of market entry decisions and interaction of attractiveness scores (survey measure)
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The Higher Your Expectations, the Lower Your Trust:
Avoiding the Experience of Unfulfilled Expectations
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Abstract 
We study a binary-choice trust game and observe a negative relationship between people’s
expectations of others’ trustworthiness and their own willingness to trust. This counterintuitive
finding may be interpreted as the result of an avoidance strategy: The more people expect 
others to be trustworthy, the warier they are of their own expectations not being fulfilled, and
the less willing they are to trust. Our research provides new insights into the origin of betrayal
aversion, i.e. why people are less willing to take a risk if the source of the risk is a human being
rather than a lottery. When facing human trustees, trustors tend to form expectations about
their counterparts’ behavior, and fit their own behavior to these expectations by lowering their
willingness to trust. Presumably, this effect does not persist if trustees are replaced by non-
human beings, i.e. lotteries, because the trustors’ decision problem becomes more ambiguous
in this case. 
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1 Introduction 
It is widely undisputed that the experience of unfilled expectations generates negative emotions, 
such as disappointment or regret, because people tend to compare the factual outcome of a 
decision with counterfactual results which might have occurred if one had chosen differently 
(see Zeelenberg, van Dijk, Manstead, & van der Pligt, 2000 for an extensive overview). The 
anticipation of unfilled expectations is a powerful driver for human decision making, since 
people usually attempt to avoid the experience of negative emotions (van Dijk, Zeelenberg, & 
van der Pligt, 2003). In fact, there are several strategies for coping with the anticipated dis-
confirmation of expectations (Zeelenberg et al., 2000). First of all, people may intentionally 
underestimate the likelihood of obtaining a desired outcome in order to reduce negative emo-
tions which they would experience if the desired outcome were not obtained (Cantor & Norem, 
1989; Loewenstein & Linville, 1986; Pyszczynski, 1982; Shepperd, Ouellette, & Fernandez, 
1996). Another simple but effective strategy is to avoid the risk of expectations being unful-
filled. In fact, choosing the safe option cannot even cause disappointment or regret, as the 
corresponding outcome does not vary and is known in advance. The tendency to avoid the 
experience of unfulfilled expectations can also be analyzed in the framework of prospect theory 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) if decision makers are assumed to use their expectations as a 
reference point (Kőszegi & Rabin, 2006). More precisely, individuals may evaluate the outcome 
of a decision either as a gain or as a loss, depending on whether the outcome is in line with 
their initial expectations. 
In the present paper, we investigate experimentally whether the anticipated experience 
of unfulfilled expectations operates in the context of trust, i.e. whether trustors lower their 
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willingness to trust, either because they attempt to avoid the risk of being betrayed or because 
they strategically overestimate the probability of being betrayed. As we will explain in the 
concluding section, the anticipated experience of unfulfilled expectations may be a source of 
betrayal aversion. However, our research goal is difficult to reach, because trustworthiness 
expectations and trust are related through different channels which may overlap and even 
counteract each other. We suggest that two key aspects have to be taken into account. 
The first one is the empirical finding that more optimistic trustworthiness expectations 
increase trustors’ expected utility of trusting and thus ceteris paribus their willingness to trust 
(Buchan, Croson, & Solnick, 2008). Previous studies which report a positive relationship be-
tween trustworthiness expectations and trust suggest indirectly that this effect outperforms 
the effect of anticipating unfulfilled expectations. Thus, identifying the effect of avoiding the 
experience of unfulfilled expectations requires a measure of trust that does not depend directly 
on trustworthiness expectations. Therefore, we employ the so-called minimum acceptable prob-
ability (MAP) trust game developed by Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004). In Section 2, we will 
point out in more depth why this framework is adequate to study our research question. The 
second key aspect is the relationship between social preferences and trustworthiness expecta-
tions. Several authors find that trustors are prone to a social projection bias, i.e. social people 
expect higher returns when taking the trustor role than selfish people do (e.g. Bellemare & 
Kröger, 2007; Butler, Giuliano, & Guiso, 2015; Thielmann & Hilbig, 2014), because social 
people would themselves reward trust if they were trustees. The strong correlation between 
social preferences and trustworthiness expectations makes it difficult to separate the effect of 
anticipating unfulfilled expectations, since social preferences and the anticipation of unfulfilled 
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expectations may exert counteracting effects on trust. Social preferences increase one’s willing-
ness to trust, whereas we expect the contrary to be true for trustworthiness expectations, 
according to people’s attempt to avoid the experience of unfulfilled expectations. Thus, meas-
uring the effect of anticipating unfulfilled expectations requires disentangling it from the coun-
teracting consequences of social preferences. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the MAP 
trust game by Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004) as well as the concept of social value orientation, 
which we use to operationalize social preferences. Furthermore, we present our experimental 
design and the procedures. In Section 3, we develop our hypotheses. This is followed by Sec-
tion 4, where we describe and explain the findings obtained from the experiment. Section 5 
summarizes our main results and points out some major theoretical implications. 
2 Methods 
2.1 Minimum Acceptable Probability Design 
As outlined above, we build on previous work of Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004), who study a 
variation of a binary-choice trust game (Camerer & Weigelt, 1988; Kreps, 1990). As depicted 
in Figure 1, the game is limited to three possible outcomes. If the trustor is not willing to trust 
(“no trust” alternative), both the trustor and the trustee receive a sure payoff, which we assume 
to be 10 points for each of them. If the trustor is willing to trust (“trust” alternative), her or 
his payoff is determined by the trustee. The trustee has to decide whether to reward (“reward” 
option) or to betray (“betrayal” option) the trustor. In the case of reward, the trustor and the 
trustee each receive the same payoff (15 points), which is higher than the first outcome. In the 
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case of betrayal, the trustor’s payoff (8 points) is smaller than the sure payoff in the case of 
not trusting. The trustee’s payoff is higher (22 points) in comparison to both the case of not 
trusting and the case of rewarding. 
>>> Insert Figure 1 about here <<< 
In the particular framework of Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004), trustors have to state the 
probability at which they are indifferent between trusting and receiving the sure payoff, i.e. 
their minimum acceptable probability (MAP). The MAP represents trustors’ switching point 
beyond which they are willing to take a risk by trusting rather than receiving the sure outcome 
by not trusting. An MAP below or equal to the proportion of trustees who reward trust, i.e. 
the actual reward probability (rpa), indicates that trustors are willing to trust (MAP ≤ rpa), 
whereas an MAP above that proportion indicates the contrary (MAP > rpa). Consequently, 
the higher a trustor’s MAP, the less she or he is willing to trust. Trustors are informed about 
the actual reward probability only after they have reported their MAP. 
The MAP design offers the important advantage that trustors’ willingness to trust, meas-
ured in terms of their MAPs, should not be directly affected by their trustworthiness expecta-
tions. To explain this crucial aspect in a more rigorous way, we take a closer look at the 
trustors’ decision problem. Assume U(no trust) to be the utility derived from choosing the safe 
outcome and let U(reward) > U(no trust) as well as U(betrayal) < U(no trust) denote the util-
ity if a trustor’s trust is rewarded or betrayed, respectively. Thus, rational trustors have to 
balance the sure utility derived from not trusting (U(no trust)) and the expected utility from 
trusting by choosing their MAPs according to the following equation: 
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U(no trust) = MAP ∙ U(reward) + (1 – MAP) ∙ U(betrayal). (1) 
Setting an MAP+ below MAP according to (1), one would accept reward probabilities which 
lead to expected utilities below the utility of the sure outcome (U(no trust)). The contrary is 
true for MAP+ > MAP. In this case, one would forgo reward probabilities that generate bene-
ficial expected utilities compared to U(no trust). Since a trustor’s MAP represents her or his 
minimum acceptable reward probability, the MAP should be independent of any considerations 
about the actual reward probability, i.e. her or his expected reward probability rpe. However, 
as we outline in more depth in Section 3, this assumption has to be relaxed if people attempt 
to avoid the experience of unfulfilled expectations. 
2.2 Social Value Orientation Slider Measure 
As pointed out at the beginning, the effect of avoiding unfulfilled expectations can only be 
measured if trustors’ concerns for trustees’ payoffs, i.e. trustors’ social preferences, are taken 
into account. We operationalize social preferences through the concept of social value orienta-
tion (SVO), which has been developed in the domain of social psychology in order to disentan-
gle the intrinsic motivations of human behavior in situations where individuals have to decide 
how to allocate a scarce resource between themselves and others (Griesinger & Livingston, 
1973; Liebrand, 1984). The SVO construct has been shown to be a valuable predictor of human 
behavior in social dilemmas (Balliet, Parks, & Joireman, 2009). In our experiment, trustors’ 
SVOs are elicited by means of the SVO Slider Measure (Murphy, Ackermann, & Handgraaf, 
2011), which provides a ranking order of a person’s SVO, covering altruistic, competitive, 
proself, and prosocial SVOs. The SVO Slider Measure contains six so-called primary items. 
Each of them refers to a choice over the allocation of joint payoffs. To be more precise, each 
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item provides decision makers with a set of possible distributions and subjects have to indicate 
their preferred distribution. The mean allocations for self and for others derived from the 
primary items can be used to compute a single score of SVO, i.e. the so-called SVO angle. 
From an individual perspective, a higher SVO angle refers to a higher tendency toward perfect 
altruism. In comparison to earlier approaches, the SVO Slider Measure offers several ad-
vantages. First and foremost, it is a continuous measure and provides thus more accurate 
information on SVO than categorical approaches, such as the SVO Ring Measure (Liebrand, 
1984). Second, it allows studying people’s motivations in isolation, i.e. separating people’s be-
liefs about others’ behavior from their strategic concerns, as it is rooted in the decomposed 
game technique developed by Messick and McClintock (1968). This aspect is important for our 
purpose, because we intend to disentangle trustworthiness expectations and social preferences. 
2.3 Experimental Design and Procedures 
The experiment was conducted in the laboratory of a large German university, using z-Tree 
(Fischbacher, 2007). Subjects were recruited via ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). We conducted seven 
sessions with 26 subjects per session, obtaining 182 independent observations. Upon arrival, 
participants were randomly assigned to a computer. Once all participants were seated, they 
were informed that they could earn cash depending on their decisions and that they would be 
paid anonymously at the end of the experiment. The experiment itself consisted of one single 
treatment with three independent parts. First, subjects took part in the binary-choice trust 
game described in Section 2.1. Second and third, subjects’ risk preferences and SVOs were 
elicited. Note that all three parts of the experiment were monetarily incentivized. 
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Given the high complexity of the binary-choice trust game, the experiment was designed 
with a strong focus on subjects’ comprehension. At the beginning of the trust game part, 
subjects were provided with written instructions which they might use during the whole ex-
periment. The experimental supervisor, being the same person in all sessions, read the instruc-
tions aloud and answered subjects’ questions individually. Moreover, subjects were given plenty 
of time to study the instructions on their own. To ensure further that participants understood 
the MAP framework well, they had to pass a comprehension task in the style of Bohnet and 
Zeckhauser (2004). To be more precise, subjects had to calculate individual payoffs for trustors 
and trustees based on hypothetical MAPs and reward probabilities. Having answered all ques-
tions correctly, subjects were randomly assigned either to the trustor or to the trustee role. 
Roles were neutrally labeled. After the assignment of roles, trustors reported their MAPs. 
Simultaneously, trustees had to choose between the “reward” option and the “betrayal” option. 
Options were also neutrally labeled. The payoff structure in the three possible scenarios was 
the same as in Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004) (see Section 2.1 for further details). 
Subsequent to the MAP trust game, trustors faced the so-called estimation task, which 
had not been announced in the written instructions. In this task, trustors were asked to esti-
mate the percentage of trustees that had chosen to reward in the binary-choice trust game, i.e. 
the expected reward probability or trustworthiness expectations. Subjects received an amount 
of two points (1.00 Euros) for a correct estimation. An estimation was defined to be correct if 
the deviation of the estimation from the actual percentage was equal to or smaller than five 
percentage points (upwards or downwards). If the estimation deviated by more than five per-
centage points and no more than ten percentage points, an amount of one point (0.50 Euros) 
was given to the subjects. We incentivized beliefs elicitation in this simple manner because the 
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procedure was easy to understand for subjects and did not require elaborated instructions. 
Subjects were not provided with any results from the trust game or any other information that 
might have helped them to solve the estimation task or to increase the expected payoff. Note 
that the estimation task was not part of the experiments conducted by Bohnet and Zeckhauser 
(2004). After the estimation task, each trustor was randomly paired with a trustee, and payoffs 
were calculated depending on the decisions made in the binary-choice trust game. 
In the next part, subjects’ risk aversion was elicited by means of the multiple price list 
method by Holt and Laury (2002). The multiple price list typically contains ten rows, each 
representing a choice between a “sure” and a “risky” gamble. After subjects had completed the 
multiple price list, one of their ten decisions was picked at random for remuneration. Subjects 
were informed about this procedure in advance. The result of the random draw was disclosed 
to participants only at the very end of the experiment. The multiple price list was followed by 
the SVO Slider Measure (Murphy et al., 2011), which has been outlined in more detail in 
Section 2.2. In a similar way to the remuneration of the multiple price list, only one of the 
decisions being part of the SVO Slider Measure was actually remunerated. 
3 Hypotheses 
The current section aims at providing a better understanding for the interplay between SVO, 
trustworthiness expectations, and the MAP. To identify the effect of avoiding the experience 
of unfulfilled expectations, it is crucial to consider the two channels through which an individ-
ual’s SVO may affect her or his MAP. Figure 2 illustrates how both of these channels may 
operate in the binary-choice trust game that we study in our experiment. On the one hand, 
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SVO may have a direct impact on MAP (Path 1). On the other hand, the influence of SVO on 
MAP may be mediated by trustworthiness expectations (Paths 2 and 3), establishing an indi-
rect relationship. 
>>> Insert Figure 2 about here <<< 
It is intuitive to assume that trustors’ SVOs positively affect their willingness to trust, 
because trust inevitably increases trustees’ payoffs, irrespective of trustees’ choice, and also the 
overall welfare. This direct relationship between SVO and the MAP corresponds to Path 1. 
The indirect relationship, in contrast, is composed of two components (Paths 2 and 3). The 
first component (Path 2) links SVO to trustworthiness expectations and can be considered to 
be the result of social projection. Generally speaking, social projection is the tendency of indi-
viduals to extrapolate from their own behavior to the behavior of others (e.g. Robbins & 
Krueger, 2005). Numerous studies provide evidence for the relationship between one’s trust-
worthiness expectations and one’s willingness to trust being consistent with social projection 
(e.g. Bellemare & Kröger, 2007; Butler et al., 2015; Thielmann & Hilbig, 2014). 
The second component (Path 3) links an individual’s trustworthiness expectations to her 
or his MAP, and refers thus to the hypothesized effect of avoiding the experience of unfulfilled 
expectations. As outlined earlier, disconfirmed expectations constitute a source of disutility, 
because trustors use their trustworthiness expectations as a reference point when evaluating 
the possible outcomes of the trust game. In this aspect, we extent previous research by Bohnet, 
Herrmann, and Zeckhauser (2010) and Breuer, Helduser, and Schade (2016), who emphasize 
the importance of reference points in the MAP trust game. 
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More formally, we argue that for trustors who set their MAPs according to (1), U(be-
trayal) is a decreasing function of their trustworthiness expectations rpe. As a consequence, 
trustors with high subjective estimates rpe, i.e. optimistic trustors, are inclined to increase their 
MAPs in order to circumvent disutility arising from unfulfilled expectations in the case of 
betrayal. To be more precise, according to (1) and to the implicit function theorem, we obtain 
the following relationship for 0 < MAP < 1 and U(reward) > U(betrayal): 
MAP
U(betrayal)  = −
1 − MAP
Uሺrewardሻ − U(betrayal)  < 0 
(2)
From (2), we may conclude that ∂MAP/∂rpe = ∂MAP/∂U(betrayal) ⋅ ∂U(betrayal)/∂rpe 
> 0 due to ∂U(betrayal)/∂rpe < 0. 
As outlined above, the two components of the indirect effect differ in their signs. Thus, 
the corresponding relationship between SVO and the MAP is positive. Since the direct and the 
indirect effect of SVO on the MAP counteract each other, the sign of the total effect, i.e. the 
aggregate of the direct and the indirect effect, is a priori unclear. However, the existing litera-
ture suggests a positive relationship between an individual’s SVO and her or his willingness to 
trust (Kanagaretnam, Mestelman, Nainar, & Shehata, 2009), which refers to a negative total 
effect of SVO on the MAP in our context. For similar reasons, the total effect of trustworthiness 
expectations on the MAP is unclear. On the one hand, high expectations may induce low MAPs 
(Path 3). On the other hand, regardless of the causal direction, expectations are positively 
correlated with SVOs, due to social projection (Path 2). Therefore, there is also a positive 
indirect relationship between expectations and MAP (Paths 1 and 2). As the effect of avoiding 
the experience of unfulfilled expectations conflicts with the consequences for trust as a function 
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of a trustor’s SVO (Path 1), the total empirical effect regarding the relationship between ex-
pectations and the MAP remains unclear, as long as Path 3 is not separated from Paths 1 
and 2. From a more formal point of view, identifying the effect of avoiding the experience of 
unfulfilled expectations in a regression model requires that SVO is controlled for, and vice 
versa. Up to this point, our reasoning can be mapped to three hypotheses, each of which refers 
to a path in Figure 2: 
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between trustors’ SVOs and their willingness 
to trust, especially if their trustworthiness expectations are controlled for 
(cf. Path 1). 
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive relationship between trustors’ SVOs and their trustwor-
thiness expectations (cf. Path 2). 
Hypothesis 3: There is a negative relationship between trustors’ trustworthiness expecta-
tions and their willingness to trust, especially if their SVOs are controlled 
for (cf. Path 3). 
We have suggested that the attempt to avoid unfulfilled expectations constitutes a posi-
tive relationship between trustworthiness expectations and the MAP. However, it is natural to 
assume that this effect is driven by people expecting the “trust” alternative to be chosen, i.e. 
people indicating low MAPs or holding optimistic trustworthiness expectations. These people 
are more concerned with avoiding negative emotions, because the “trust” alternative bears a 
higher risk of not being satisfied with the outcome than the “no trust” alternative does. In the 
case of betrayal, people know for sure that the “no trust” alternative, which could have been 
reached by choosing higher MAPs, would have yielded a higher payoff. In contrast, people who 
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end up with the “no trust” alternative will not find out whether the “trust” alternative would 
have actually been a better choice or not. Compared to the “no trust” alternative, choosing the 
“trust” alternative produces worse outcomes for trustors if trustees decide to betray. This rea-
soning corresponds to previous research in a broader sense. Zeelenberg (1999), for instance, 
suggests that anticipated regret increases if people expect to get feedback on their choice. Thus, 
we propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: The negative relationship between people’s trustworthiness expectations and 
their willingness to trust is more intense for trustors who expect the “trust” 
alternative to be chosen than it is for others. 
4 Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Across all sessions, 91 subjects were assigned to the trustor role (54 males and 37 females) and 
to the trustee role (51 males and 40 females), respectively, and the proportion of female par-
ticipants ranged from 30.8 % to 53.8 %. Trustors’ mean MAP was 57.2 % (SD = 0.259). The 
MAPs did not differ significantly either between female and male trustors (Mann-Whitney test, 
Z = -0.961, p = 0.336) or between sessions (Chi-squared test, χ2 = 131.723, p = 0.760). The 
overall actual reward probability rpa, computed across all sessions, was 49.5 %. The corre-
sponding statistics are depicted in Table 1. 
>>> Insert Table 1 about here <<< 
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According to the estimation task, trustors expected on average 47.8 % (SD = 0.243) of 
the trustees to be willing to reward trust. Thus, trustors only slightly underestimated the 
actual reward probability (rpa = 49.5 %). Referring to their trustworthiness expectations, 
women (M = 39.2 %, SD = 0.212) were considerably more pessimistic than men were 
(M = 53.7 %, SD = 0.247). An independent-samples t-test (t(89) = -2.911, p < 0.01) shows 
that the difference of the trustworthiness expectations between female and male trustors was 
statistically significant. This finding is in line with previous research on gender differences in 
preferences (e.g. Croson & Gneezy, 2009; Garbarino & Slonim, 2009). The corresponding sta-
tistics are depicted in Table 2. 
>>> Insert Table 2 about here <<< 
The SVO Slider Measure revealed that trustors can be classified either as being proself 
(49.5 %) or prosocial (50.5 %). According to a Chi-squared test (χ2 = 0.016, p = 0.899), the 
proportion of prosocial subjects did not differ significantly between female trustors (48.6 %) 
and male trustors (50.0 %). A more rigorous way to describe a subject’s SVO is to consider 
her or his continuous SVO angle, computed by the SVO Slider Measure. Trustors’ average 
angle was 20.946 degrees (SD = 13.087). The mean SVO angle was lower for women 
(M = 19.757, SD = 13.146) than for men (M = 21.761, SD = 13.107). A Mann-Whitney test 
did not indicate a statistically significant gender difference in this aspect (Z = -1.056, 
p = 0.294). As the SVO angle allows values ranging from -16.26 to 61.39 degrees and the 
threshold between proself and prosocial SVO is 22.45 degrees, the mean SVO angles indicate a 
slight tendency toward proself SVO. 
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4.2 Hypotheses Testing 
Our hypotheses suggest that the effect of SVO on trust is mediated by trustworthiness expec-
tations. The effect of anticipating unfulfilled expectations (Path 3 in Figure 2) is part of the 
indirect effect which relates SVO to trust (Paths 2 + 3). We expect the indirect effect to mit-
igate the total effect of SVO (the so-called suppressor effect). An indirect effect is said to be a 
suppressor effect if the direct and the indirect effect that an independent variable exerts on a 
dependent variable have opposite signs. As we study a standard mediation setting containing 
an independent variable (SVO), a mediator variable (expected reward probability/trustworthi-
ness expectations rpe), and a dependent variable of trust (MAP), we apply the stepwise ap-
proach established by Baron and Kenny (1986) to verify our hypotheses. In addition, we ex-
plicitly test the statistical significance of the indirect effect. Since the variables of interest are 
fractions, we base the following analysis on generalized linear models with logistic link functions 
(Papke & Wooldridge, 1996). 
In the first step, we consider the relationship between SVO and the MAP without con-
trolling for the mediator variable, i.e. the total effect of SVO. In all models, we control for 
subjects’ gender, because people’s behavior may differ between women and men (e.g. Croson 
& Gneezy, 2009; Garbarino & Slonim, 2009). Model 1 (see Table 3) reveals a significantly neg-
ative effect: The more socially orientated a trustor is, the lower her or his MAP is. Note that 
a lower MAP implies a higher willingness to trust, and vice versa. This finding corresponds to 
Hypothesis 1. In the second step, we study the first component of the indirect effect of SVO 
on trust (Path 2). Figure 3 illustrates that, in line with Hypothesis 2, prosocial trustors have 
higher mean trustworthiness expectations rpe (M = 0.571, SD = 0.233) than proself trustors 
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have (M = 0.388, SD = 0.220). An independent-samples t-test shows that trustworthiness ex-
pectations differ significantly between prosocial and proself trustors (t(89) = -3.844, 
p < 0.001). According to the assumption that subjects are prone to social projection, prosocial 
trustors overestimate the reward probability, whereas proself trustors underestimate it. 
Model 2 of Table 3 confirms the positive effect of SVO on trustworthiness expectations.  
>>> Insert Table 3 and Figure 3 about here <<< 
In the third step, we examine the second component of the indirect effect (Path 3). We 
observe a positive effect of trustworthiness expectations on the MAP (Model 3) which is sig-
nificant on the 10 % level. To separate the effect of Path 3 from the counteracting effect of 
SVO on the MAP (Path 1), we run an additional model in which we control for SVO (Model 4). 
In the extended model, the effect of trustworthiness expectations becomes highly significant. 
The effect size of both trustworthiness expectations and SVO substantially increases. These 
findings are in line with our theoretical considerations, since the direct effect and the indirect 
effect are expected to mitigate each other. These results correspond to Hypotheses 1 and 3. 
Note that we obtain similar results by running linear regressions in the style of Bohnet and 
Zeckhauser (2004) (see Table A.1 in the Appendix). 
To complete the mediation analysis, we test the statistical significance of the indirect 
effect. A Sobel test reveals that the mediation effect of trustworthiness expectations is statis-
tically significant (p = 0.020), reducing the size of the total effect of SVO on trust by approx-
imately 52.2 %. As the Sobel test is often criticized for its low power (see Zhao, Lynch, & 
Chen, 2010 for further details), we also test the indirect effect by means of the more rigorous 
bootstrapping method (Preacher & Hayes, 2004). Using 10,000 resamples, bootstrapping also 
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indicates a statistically significant indirect effect (p = 0.019). Summing up, both tests confirm 
the results obtained from our stepwise analysis. 
In order to test Hypothesis 4, we split our dataset into two subsamples, based on whether 
subjects expected the “no trust” alternative (MAP > rpe) or the “trust” alternative (MAP ≤ rpe) 
to be chosen. We separately rerun Model 4 for both subsamples to identify potential differences 
with respect to the role of trustworthiness expectations. According to Models 5 and 6, the effect 
of trustworthiness expectations on the MAP is significantly positive in both subsamples. How-
ever, the respective coefficients indicate that the effect is more pronounced if people expect the 
“trust” alternative to be chosen. In fact, the coefficients differ significantly between the two 
subsamples (χ2 = 332.80, p < 0.001). This finding, which is fully in line with Hypothesis 4, can 
be confirmed by the OLS regressions presented in the Appendix. The substantial increase of 
the adjusted R-squared from Model 5 to Model 6 (see Table A.1 in the Appendix) provides 
additional support for the elevated importance of trustworthiness expectations if the “trust” 
alternative is expected to be chosen. 
Since trust is often assumed to be a risky decision (e.g. Eckel & Wilson, 2004), we repeat 
the previous steps and control for subjects’ risk aversion, which we measure by means of the 
number of “safe” options chosen in the multiple price list (Holt & Laury, 2002). Note that all 
those subjects holding inconsistent risk preferences, including subjects switching more than 
once between the two options and those rejecting the safe option in the last decision problem, 
have to be dropped. The inconsistency rate of 18.7 % (17 out of 91 subjects) is in line with the 
literature (see, e.g., Holt & Laury, 2002). The extended models reassure our previous findings 
in all aspects (see Model 1 to Model 6 in Table 4), yielding also highly significant effects. Again, 
the coefficients of trustworthiness expectations differ significantly between both subsamples 
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(χ2 = 302.52, p < 0.001). Note that the corresponding OLS regressions are presented in Table 
A.2 in the Appendix. 
>>> Insert Table 4 about here <<< 
In analogy to our previous analysis, we also re-conduct the Sobel test. If risk aversion is 
included, the mediation effect of trustworthiness expectations turns out to be statistically sig-
nificant (p = 0.028). The indirect effect of trustworthiness expectations on trust reduces the 
size of the total effect by approximately 66.7 %. The more rigorous bootstrapping approach 
with 10,000 resamples confirms the statistical significance of the indirect effect (p = 0.038). 
4.3 Causality 
Our previous analysis revealed a positive correlation between subjects’ trustworthiness expec-
tations and their MAPs. However, we did not discuss the two distinct causalities that may 
underlie this relationship: People may either truthfully reveal their MAPs and fit their trust-
worthiness expectations to the latter, or the other way round. If trustors are biased in terms 
of their expectations, one would expect their average expectations to be lower than those of 
non-biased subjects, as a consequence of avoiding the experience of unfulfilled expectations. As 
an external validation of trustworthiness expectations, we compare trustors’ expectations to 
those of two distinct reference groups which we expect to be unbiased in this regard. First, we 
compare trustors’ expectations (M = 47.8 %, SD = 0.243, N = 91) with those reported by trus-
tees (M = 46.9 %, SD = 0.264, N = 91). Second, we consider trustworthiness expectations of 
people who have not even participated in the experiment. 
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To obtain trustworthiness expectations from outside the laboratory, we conducted an 
online survey among students from a large German university. The survey was advertised in 
several undergraduate and postgraduate courses. Analogously to the laboratory experiment, 
participants (N = 120) were first provided with general information on the binary-choice trust 
game, such as the payoff matrix. Subsequently, they had to pass a comprehension test in the 
style of Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004). Subjects could only proceed if they had correctly an-
swered all comprehension questions. Then, they were asked to estimate the reward probability 
which we had actually observed in the laboratory experiment (rpa = 49.5 %). The estimation 
was incentivized in a similar manner to the estimation task in our laboratory experiment. 
Participants received an additional fee of 5.00 Euros. The total amounts were transferred to 
participants in the form of a digital gift voucher for the university shop.   
Comparing the three samples in terms of subjects’ trustworthiness expectations confirms 
that trustors fit their MAPs to their expectations, and not the other way round. Since the data 
from the three samples are not normally distributed (see Table 5 for descriptive statistics), we 
carry out a set of non-parametrical tests. A Kruskal-Wallis test does not reveal a statistically 
significant difference between the three samples (H(2) = 1.702, p = 0.427). To account for 
potential gender differences, we split all three samples with respect to subjects’ gender and run 
separate Kruskal-Wallis tests for women and men. The additional tests do not indicate signif-
icant differences either within the female subsample (H(2) = 2.756, p = 0.252) or the male 
subsample (H(2) = 3.641, p = 0.162). 
>>> Insert Table 5 about here <<< 
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5 Conclusion 
In this paper we have studied the relationship between trustors’ expectations about others’ 
trustworthiness and their own willingness to trust. In contrast to previous studies, we found 
that the more people expect others to be trustworthy, the less willing they are to trust. This 
counterintuitive finding can be interpreted as follows: People lower their willingness to trust 
in order to avoid the experience of negative emotions, such as disappointment or regret, which 
will occur if positive expectations are not fulfilled. As we could show experimentally, measuring 
the anticipation of unfulfilled expectations in the context of trust requires a particular experi-
mental design. First, the measure for people’s willingness to trust should not depend directly 
on their trustworthiness expectations. For this reason, we employed the MAP trust game by 
Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004), which is based on the latent assumption of trust measured in 
terms of people’s MAPs being independent of trustworthiness expectations (Bohnet et al., 2010; 
Bohnet, Greig, Herrmann, & Zeckhauser, 2008). Second, social preferences have to be taken 
into account, since they are entangled with both trust and trustworthiness expectations. 
From a theoretical point of view, our findings are intriguing, since they provide new 
insights into the origin of betrayal aversion. Betrayal aversion refers to the phenomenon that 
people are less willing to take a risk if the source of the risk is a human being rather than a 
lottery (Aimone & Houser, 2012; Bohnet et al., 2008; Bohnet et al., 2010; Bohnet & Zeckhauser, 
2004). A common approach to demonstrate the existence of betrayal aversion is to compare 
the binary-choice trust game of Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004) to a so-called risky dictator 
game, where the human trustee is replaced by a synthetic trustee, i.e. a lottery. The existence 
of betrayal aversion is assumed for situations with trustors stating higher MAPs in the binary-
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choice trust game than they do in the risky dictator game. A reason for betrayal aversion is 
that people’s perceptions of structurally identical payoffs depend on whether these payoffs are 
determined by a human being or a lottery: A monetary loss in the binary-choice trust game is 
regarded as an act of betrayal, whereas such a loss in a lottery is merely evaluated as “bad 
luck” (Fetchenhauer & Dunning, 2009).  
The present study provides empirical evidence for why people are betrayal averse. In line 
with Aimone and Houser (2012), who briefly point out to loss aversion as a potential driver for 
betrayal aversion, we argue that the observed effect of avoiding unfulfilled expectations is likely 
to occur in the binary-choice trust game rather than in the risky dictator game. In the binary-
choice trust game, the probabilities of reward and betrayal are ex ante unknown. Therefore, 
the decision about whether to trust can be considered to be an ambiguous one. However, people 
tend to form beliefs about the probabilities of reward and betrayal, e.g. based on past experi-
ence or on social projection. In this aspect, the binary-choice trust game differs substantially 
from the risky dictator game, where neither past experience nor social projection provide val-
uable information on how the lottery will decide. Thus, in comparison to the binary-choice 
trust game, the risky dictator game resembles even more a decision problem under ambiguity, 
and is less prone to the effect of avoiding unfulfilled expectations. According to this line of 
reasoning, betrayal aversion is not a direct consequence of facing a human antagonist per se, 
but rather caused by the fact that human behavior might be anticipated in an easier way than 
random reactions by computers. Taken together, our findings may at least partly explain why 
people state higher MAPs in the binary-choice trust game than they do in the risky dictator 
game. Future research should address whether the different drivers of betrayal aversion can be 
disentangled from each other.  
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Tables 
 Minimum Acceptable Probabilities (MAPs) 
 Overall Women Men 
Mean 0.572 0.598 0.553 
Median 0.600 0.600 0.600 
Standard Deviation 0.259 0.249 0.267 
N 91 37 54 
Table 1: Minimum acceptable probabilities stated in the binary-choice trust game 
 Trustworthiness Expectations (rpe) 
 Overall Women Men 
Mean 0.478 0.392 0.537 
Median 0.470 0.400 0.575 
Standard Deviation 0.243 0.212 0.247 
N 91 37 54 
Table 2: Trustors’ trustworthiness expectations stated in the estimation task 
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Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable MAP rpe MAP MAP MAP (MAP > rpe) 
MAP 
(MAP ≤ rpe) 
Social Value Orientation (SVO) -0.020*** 0.031***  -0.031*** -0.003 -0.022** 
 (0.007) (0.005)  (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) 
Expected Reward Probability (rpe)   0.682* 1.446*** 1.764*** 4.420*** 
   (0.398) (0.430) (0.292) (1.093) 
Gender (0 = female, 1 = male) -0.146 0.549*** -0.283 -0.333* -0.061 -0.540*** 
 (0.187) (0.134) (0.203) (0.183) (0.237) (0.137) 
Constant 0.798*** -1.072*** 0.132 0.466* 0.215 -2.203*** 
 (0.193) (0.132) (0.212) (0.243) (0.211) (0.840) 
Observations 91 91 91 91 54 37 
Generalized Linear Models with logit link functions 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered for experimental sessions 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Table 3: Influences on the dependent variables MAP and Expected Reward Probability
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Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable MAP rpe MAP MAP MAP (MAP > rpe) 
MAP 
(MAP ≤ rpe) 
Social Value Orientation (SVO) -0.016*** 0.032***  -0.028*** -0.004 -0.011** 
 (0.005) (0.010)  (0.005) (0.012) (0.005) 
Expected Reward Probability (rpe)   0.747 1.502*** 2.097*** 4.418*** 
   (0.499) (0.475) (0.800) (1.182) 
Gender (0 = female, 1 = male) 0.004 0.668*** -0.200 -0.221 -0.051 -0.429*** 
 (0.248) (0.097) (0.251) (0.228) (0.183) (0.163) 
Risk Aversion 0.123* 0.036 0.130 0.112 0.169*** 0.012 
 (0.070) (0.033) (0.082) (0.069) (0.034) (0.099) 
Constant 0.071 -1.271*** -0.553 -0.230 -0.840*** -2.443*** 
 (0.500) (0.291) (0.619) (0.516) (0.313) (0.639) 
Observations 74 74 74 74 45 29 
Generalized Linear Models with logit link functions 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered for experimental sessions 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Table 4: Influences on the dependent variables MAP and Expected Reward Probability
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  Trustworthiness Expectations 
Source Sample Overall Women Men 
Experiment Trustors 0.478 0.392 0.537 
Experiment Trustees 0.461 0.491 0.452 
Online Survey All Participants 0.437 0.411 0.456 
Table 5: Mean trustworthiness expectations
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Figures 
 
Figure 1: Binary-choice trust game  
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Figure 2: Direct and indirect effect of SVO on the MAP 
 
Figure 3: Actual and expected reward probabilities on the overall level
  
118 
 
Appendix 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable MAP rpe MAP MAP MAP (MAP > rpe) 
MAP 
(MAP ≤ rpe) 
Social Value Orientation (SVO) -0.005** 0.007***  -0.007*** -0.001 -0.004 
 (0.002) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Expected Reward Probability (rpe)   0.166 0.339** 0.363*** 0.802*** 
   (0.097) (0.100) (0.070) (0.159) 
Gender (0 = female, 1 = male) -0.035 0.130*** -0.069 -0.079 -0.012 -0.072* 
 (0.045) (0.033) (0.050) (0.044) (0.050) (0.032) 
Constant 0.693*** 0.245*** 0.533*** 0.610*** 0.564*** 0.064 
 (0.044) (0.030) (0.052) (0.057) (0.050) (0.183) 
Observations 91 91 91 91 54 37 
Adj. R-squared 0.045 0.229 0.008 0.113 0.091 0.407 
OLS regressions 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered for experimental sessions 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Table A.1: Influences on the dependent variables MAP and Expected Reward Probability (OLS regressions) 
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Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable MAP rpe MAP MAP MAP (MAP > rpe) 
MAP 
(MAP ≤ rpe) 
Social Value Orientation (SVO) -0.004** 0.007**  -0.006*** -0.000 -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Expected Reward Probability (rpe)   0.173 0.339** 0.396* 0.985*** 
   (0.117) (0.106) (0.169) (0.254) 
Gender (0 = female, 1 = male) 0.001 0.159*** -0.047 -0.053 -0.012 -0.087* 
 (0.059) (0.022) (0.060) (0.055) (0.038) (0.041) 
Risk Aversion 0.029 0.008 0.031 0.026 0.034*** 0.006 
 (0.017) (0.008) (0.020) (0.016) (0.008) (0.024) 
Constant 0.519*** 0.207** 0.373** 0.449** 0.358*** -0.068 
 (0.123) (0.066) (0.150) (0.122) (0.074) (0.149) 
Observations 74 74 74 74 45 29 
Adj. R-squared 0.058 0.293 0.039 0.129 0.198 0.519 
OLS regressions 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered for experimental sessions 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Table A.2: Influences on the dependent variables MAP and Expected Reward Probability (OLS regressions)
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Breaking the Rules: Anticipation of 
Norm Violation in a Binary-Choice Trust Game 
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Abstract 
Studying a binary-choice trust game, we find that trustors who consider trustees to be obligated 
to reciprocate are ceteris paribus less willing to trust. We argue that norm-orientated trustors
anticipate that they will experience negative emotions should trustees violate the obligation to 
reciprocate. In order to avoid norm violation, trustors lower their willingness to trust. An 
additional binary-choice trust game, in which subjects act as trustors and subsequently as
trustees, reveals that the obligation that trustors assign to the trustee role may be based on 
social projection. 
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1 Introduction 
A large body of literature emphasizes the influence of norms and obligation on decision making, 
especially in the context of trust. Interestingly, most studies have focused on the role of the 
responder, suggesting that trustees may feel an obligation to behave reciprocally when receiving 
a positive amount (e.g. Ostrom, 2003). These findings are in line with psychological research 
which postulates the existence of a “norm of reciprocity” (Gouldner, 1960). To our knowledge, 
there is only one study that explicitly takes into account the influence of obligation on trustors’ 
behavior. Buchan, Croson, and Solnick (2008) examine whether trustors feel obligated to trust, 
i.e. to send money to the trustee, and find that a feeling of obligation increases trustors’ like-
liness of sending any money. In this paper, we propose an explanation for why obligation 
feelings may lower trustors’ willingness to trust, rather than increasing it. As an extension of 
the previous literature, we do not only examine trustors’ own obligation felt, but also their 
attitudes toward trustees’ obligation to reciprocate trust. In this context, we also investigate 
whether trustors act in accordance with these attitudes when taking the trustee role. 
2 Related Literature and Hypotheses 
As outlined above, it is still unclear whether trustors’ behavior is driven by the obligation 
which trustors assign to the trustee role. In fact, norm-orientated trustors may ex ante evaluate 
trustees’ behavior on the basis of certain norms (e.g. the norm of reciprocity), because norms 
are not only positive or negative internal valuations for one’s own behavior, but also for the 
behavior of others (e.g. Broom & Selznick, 1963; Williams, 1960). Thus, differences in norm 
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orientation among trustors may result in different evaluations of trustees’ behavior. Obviously, 
a norm-orientated trustor should be more concerned about non-reciprocal, i.e. norm-violating, 
behavior of others than a trustor who is not norm-orientated. People who believe in a certain 
norm may suffer negative emotions or disappointment when this norm is violated by others 
(Wilson & O’Gorman, 2003). From the trustors’ perspective, the simplest way to reduce this 
“risk” is to lower their willingness to trust. Under this assumption, both the obligation that a 
trustor feels with respect to her or his own decision and the obligation that she or he assigns 
to the trustee’s decision exert opposite effects on trust. Presumably, both kinds of obligation 
feelings are positively correlated, because both reflect a more general behavioral pattern of 
norm orientation. Therefore, identifying the effect of anticipated norm violation on trust re-
quires a simultaneous consideration of trustors’ own feelings of obligation and the obligation 
that trustors assign to the trustee role. We propose the following two hypotheses to cover both 
kinds of obligation feelings: 
H1a: Trustors who consider trustees to be obligated to reciprocate are less willing to trust. 
H1b: Trustors who feel obligated to trust are more willing to trust. 
In a second step, we investigate a potential source of the obligation that trustors assign 
to the trustee role. According to the social projection hypothesis, we expect that trustors con-
sider trustees to be obligated to reciprocate, because the former have internalized the norm of 
reciprocity and would thus themselves behave reciprocally in the trustee role. Therefore, we 
expect trustors to act in accordance with this norm when actually taking the trustee role in a 
repeated trust game: 
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H2: Trustors who consider trustees to be obligated to reciprocate are more willing to recip-
rocate when they act as trustees. 
We refrain from hypothesizing a certain relationship between a subject’s own obligation 
felt in the trustor role and her or his willingness to reward trust in the trustee role, since there 
might be two counteracting effects. One might expect subjects who do not feel obligated in the 
trustor role to exhibit a low willingness to reward in the trustee role. However, subjects who 
do not feel obligated in the trustor role are likely not to trust and might thus be positively 
surprised when they are trusted in the trustee role, implying a higher willingness to reward. 
3 Experimental Design and Procedures 
We conducted two experiments in the laboratory of a large German university, using z-Tree 
(Fischbacher, 2007). In both experiments, subjects first played the binary-choice trust game 
introduced by Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004). A particular feature of this game is that a ra-
tional trustor’s behavior should not be affected by her or his trustworthiness beliefs (Bohnet, 
Greig, Herrmann, & Zeckhauser, 2008; Bohnet, Herrmann, & Zeckhauser, 2010). The irrele-
vance of trustworthiness beliefs may be helpful to identify undistorted effects of obligation 
feelings. Second, subjects’ risk preferences were elicited by means of the commonly used mul-
tiple price list method (Holt & Laury, 2002). The experiments only differed in one aspect: In 
the “Single Role” (SR) experiment (five sessions with 140 participants), each subject played the 
binary-choice trust game only once, either as trustor or as trustee, whereas subjects subse-
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quently took both roles in the “Both Roles” (BR) experiment (four sessions with 116 partici-
pants). Recall that subjects playing both roles are required with respect to H2. In the BR 
experiment, subjects were informed about the switch of roles only after having completed the 
first round. Moreover, they got to know that in the second round, they would be paired with 
a different person than in the first round. 
In both experiments, the core of the binary-choice trust game followed the same proce-
dure as in Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004), including the payoff structure. One point was equal 
to 0.50 Euros (see Figure 1). First of all, participants were randomly assigned either to the 
trustor or to the trustee role. After the assignment of roles, trustors reported the probability 
at which they would prefer to trust rather than to receive the sure payoff, i.e. their minimum 
acceptable probability (MAP). Trustors were not informed about the actual reward probability 
(rpa) and all payoffs until the very end of the experiment. A reported MAP below or equal to 
the proportion of trustees who reward trust indicates that a trustor is willing to trust 
(MAP ≤ rpa), whereas a reported MAP above that proportion indicates the contrary 
(MAP > rpa). Simultaneously, trustees had to choose between Option 1 (i.e. to reward trust) 
and Option 2 (i.e. not to reward trust). Having revealed their MAP, trustors (Player A) had 
to state on a four-point scale whether they agreed with the two following statements: “Player 
B has an obligation to choose Option 1” (variable: OBL1) and “I felt obligated to state a lower 
value for the MAP” (variable: OBL2). Moreover, trustors were asked to estimate the actual 
rate of reward (rpa). This estimation task was incentivized. Note that neither the estimation 
task nor the obligation questions were part of the experiments conducted by Bohnet and Zeck-
hauser (2004). 
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>>> Insert Figure 1 about here <<< 
4 Results 
To test H1a and H1b, we consider trustors from both experiments, except for those who were 
first assigned to the trustee role in the BR experiment, i.e. “second round” trustors. The reason 
behind this is simply that we expect “second round” trustors to identify more with the trustee 
role than “first round” trustors do. Presumably, closing the empathy gap between the roles may 
reduce a trustor’s cognitive dissonance in the case of norm violation committed by the trustee. 
As we control for risk aversion, we only consider subjects holding consistent risk preferences. 
Since the MAP is a fraction, we base our investigation of H1a and H1b on generalized 
linear models with a logistic link function (Papke & Wooldridge, 1996). Besides our two main 
variables of interest, OBL1 and OBL2, we take into account trustors’ risk aversion, gender, 
and their belief about the actual reward probability (variable: Trustworthiness Belief) as con-
trol variables. The latter was derived from the estimation task. In addition, we checked that 
multicollinearity is not an issue in all regressions. Model 1 in Table 1 confirms that risk aver-
sion, but not gender and trustworthiness beliefs affect the MAP. More importantly, it reveals 
a negative effect of OBL2 and a positive effect of OBL1. Both findings provide support for H1a 
and H1b. Probably as a consequence of increasing empathy, which has been outlined above, 
the effect of OBL1 disappears if we include “second mover” trustors in our sample (results not 
reported). Furthermore, it should be noted that the positive effect of OBL1 on the MAP does 
not necessarily imply a negative univariate correlation between a subject’s willingness to trust 
as a trustor and her or his willingness to reward trust as a trustee, due to the influence of the 
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other explanatory variables. Actually, there is no statistically significant correlation between 
the MAP and Reward (r = -0.108, p = 0.248). 
>>> Insert Table 1 about here <<< 
In order to test H2, we consider all subjects taking part in the BR experiment. As our 
variable of interest (Reward) has two possible outcomes, we run a binary logistic regression 
including OBL1 as predictor (see Model 2 in Table 1). We control for OBL2, gender, and for 
whether subjects acted as “first round” or “second round” trustors (variable: Order). Model 2 
reveals that OBL1 has a significant positive influence on Reward, as predicted by H2. Neither 
OBL2 nor gender and Order play a significant role. We outlined a possible explanation for the 
insignificance of OBL2 in Section 2. 
5 Conclusion 
Our study sheds new light on the role of obligation in the context of trust: Trustors who 
consider trustees to be obligated to reciprocate are ceteris paribus less willing to trust. Moreo-
ver, trustors behave in accordance with their attitudes toward trustees’ obligation when taking 
the trustee role. Our results may be interpreted as the outcome of reference-point-dependent 
preferences. According to prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), negative deviations 
from a reference point cause a loss of utility. In the trust game, norms related to reciprocal 
behavior may constitute such a reference point for trustors: If trustees violate them, trustors 
suffer a non-monetary loss of utility. According to Alm, McClelland, and Schulze (1999), dif-
ferent social norms might be a potential reason for varying reference points. 
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Moreover, our findings may provide evidence for the research by Bohnet et al. (2010), 
who trace back cultural differences in trusting behavior to different reference points for trust-
worthiness, which we think may reflect differences in social norms across cultures. From an 
evolutionary perspective, the anticipation of norm violation may help to “stabilize” the overall 
level of trust in repeated interactions if the first causes a smaller decline in trust ex ante than 
actual disappointment might eventually do ex post. Additionally, our findings may be linked 
to the observation that trustworthiness grows continuously over the human life-cycle, whereas 
the degree of trust only increases in the early years of life (e.g. Sutter & Kocher, 2007). In line 
with our argumentation, the anticipation of norm violation might hinder trust from increasing 
at a later age, once people have actually experienced negative emotions resulting from betrayal. 
However, more research is required to gain a better understanding of both aspects outlined 
above. 
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Tables 
Model (1) (2) 
Dependent Variable MAP Reward 
OBL1 0.198*** 0.743*** 
 (0.071) (0.269) 
OBL2 -0.450*** -0.067 
 (0.126) (0.363) 
Trustworthiness Belief -0.259  
 (0.355)  
Gender (1 = Male) -0.094 0.005 
 (0.186) (0.335) 
Risk Aversion 0.159**  
 
(0.069)  
Order  0.425 
  (0.561) 
Constant 0.191 -1.903*** 
 
(0.506) (0.237) 
Pseudo R-squared  0.110 
Sessions from SR 5  
Sessions from BR 4 4 
Observations 117 116 
(1) Generalized linear model with logistic link function on the MAP 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered for experimental sessions 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
(2) Binary logistic regression on Reward (1 = Yes) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered for experimental sessions 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Table 1: Determinants of the MAP and Reward  
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Figures 
 
Figure 1: Binary-choice trust game 
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Abstract 
We study a repeated binary-choice trust game in which subjects take the trustor role and then 
take the trustee role, and vice versa. In line with previous studies, we find that individuals’ 
willingness to trust in the trustor role is positively correlated with their willingness to reward 
trust, i.e. to act trustworthily, in the trustee role. However, this correlation is moderated by
subjects’ expectations about the trustworthiness of others. If people hold optimistic trustwor-
thiness expectations, their willingness to trust is positively related to their willingness to re-
ward. The contrary relationship is true for pessimists. We argue that from an individual per-
spective, the expected utility of trusting depends on the emotions which people expect to ex-
perience when being rewarded or betrayed. Optimists tend to overweight positive emotions, 
whereas pessimists place more emphasis on negative emotions. Therefore, the moderator effect 
of trustworthiness expectations occurs. 
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1 Introduction 
The importance of trust and the willingness to reward trust (i.e. trustworthiness) is widely 
undisputed among economists. In the field of experimental economics, most studies build on 
the trust game by Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995). This game is typically run one-shot, 
i.e. participants are assigned either to the trustor or to the trustee role. Surprisingly, the ques-
tion of how trust and trustworthiness are correlated within individuals has only aroused little 
interest up to now. Prominent models which have been set up to explain behavior in social 
dilemmas imply a negative correlation between trust and trustworthiness (see, e.g., Bolton & 
Ockenfels, 2000; Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger, 2004; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). However, there is 
empirical evidence challenging this implication: Altmann, Dohmen, and Wibral (2008) run an 
experiment where participants take the trustor role and then take the trustee role, and vice 
versa. The authors find a positive intrapersonal correlation between trust and trustworthiness. 
This finding has been replicated in a sequential-moves prisoner’s dilemma (Blanco, Engelmann, 
& Normann, 2011) and a sequential voluntary contribution game (Gächter, Nosenzo, Renner, 
& Sefton, 2012). 
Thus, the underlying mechanisms of the correlation between trust and trustworthiness 
are still not fully understood. It seems likely that the positive correlation between trust and 
trustworthiness is driven by certain (social) preferences, which likewise promote trust and 
trustworthiness. Altruistic individuals, for instance, may choose to send higher amounts as 
trustors and to return higher amounts as trustees than non-altruistic ones do, because the 
former derive utility simply from increasing the payoff of their counterparts. From a more 
theoretical point of view, however, the preference-based link between trust and trustworthiness 
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does not necessarily induce a positive correlation between both. To illustrate the ambiguity of 
the preference-based link, consider a binary-choice trust game, where the trustor decides 
whether to trust and where the trustee can either reward or betray the trustor’s trust. 
Let rpe be the trustor’s expected reward probability. First, we abstract from social pref-
erences. Then, her or his utility in the case of trust being rewarded is denoted as Ureward, while 
Ubetrayal is her or his utility in the case of trust being betrayed. In such a situation, the expected 
utility of trusting, Utrust, is simply 
Utrust = rpe ∙ Ureward + (1 – rpe) ∙ Ubetrayal. (1) 
The expected utility of trusting changes in two aspects if the trustor is assumed to have 
social preferences: 
Utrust = rpe ∙ (Ureward + ∆Ureward) + (1 – rpe) ∙ (Ubetrayal + ∆Ubetrayal). (2) 
On the one hand, the “social” trustor experiences an additional utility increase 
(∆Ureward > 0) when her or his trust is rewarded. On the other hand, she or he suffers an 
additional utility decrease (∆Ubetrayal < 0) in the case of trust being betrayed. Under the as-
sumption that the existence of social preferences increases an individual’s willingness to reward 
trust (i.e. her or his trustworthiness) in either case, the relative size of ∆Ureward and ∆Ubetrayal 
determines whether trust and trustworthiness are positively or negatively correlated within 
this person. As social preferences simultaneously imply ∆Ureward > 0 and ∆Ubetrayal < 0, their 
total effect on the relationship between trust and trustworthiness is a priori ambiguous. If  
rpe ∙ ∆Ureward + (1 – rpe) ∙ ∆Ubetrayal > 0,  (3) 
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social preferences increase one’s willingness to trust and induce thus a positive correlation. The 
contrary is true for rpe ∙ ∆Ureward + (1 – rpe) ∙ ∆Ubetrayal < 0. 
The goal of the present paper is to contribute to a better understanding of how trust and 
trustworthiness are related within individuals if social preferences are assumed. Apparently, 
according to (3), people’s expectations about others’ trustworthiness, i.e. their trustworthiness 
expectations (rpe), are relevant in this context. In fact, trustworthiness expectations may con-
nect trust and trustworthiness in several ways. The most straightforward effect is that Utrust 
in (1) is an increasing function of rpe. However, besides this direct effect, there are two other, 
more indirect ways in which expectations about others’ trustworthiness determine the relation-
ship between an individual’s own trustworthiness and her or his willingness to trust. These are 
depicted in Figure 1. One of them is based on a consensus effect (Paths 1 and 2 in Figure 1): 
Trustworthy people expect others to be similarly trustworthy, and are therefore more willing 
to trust than people who themselves are not trustworthy (e.g. Altmann et al., 2008; Blanco, 
Engelmann, Koch, & Normann, 2014; Mullen et al., 1985; Ross, Greene, & House, 1977). In a 
recent contribution, Breuer, Helduser, and Schade (2017) show that trustors evaluate the out-
comes of a binary-choice trust game with respect to their initial expectations. As people are 
averse to expectations being unfulfilled, they lower their willingness to trust in order to avoid 
an unexpected loss as a result of betrayal. Note that Breuer et al. (2017) build on social value 
orientation as a proxy for social preferences rather than on trustworthiness observed in a trust 
game. The implications of this divergence are discussed in more depth later on. The studies 
cited above suggest that trustworthiness beliefs mediate the intrapersonal relationship between 
trust and trustworthiness. In the present study, by contrast, we hypothesize that trustworthi-
ness expectations may also constitute a moderator (Path 3 in Figure 1). Such a moderator 
  
137 
 
effect may be driven by trustworthiness expectations (rpe) increasing one’s willingness to trust 
for given values ∆Ureward > 0 and ∆Ubetrayal < 0, according to (3). As we will outline in more 
depth, we go one step further by proposing that rpe may also affect the size of 
∆Ureward and ∆Ubetrayal. 
>>> Insert Figure 1 about here <<< 
The remainder of the present paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce 
the binary-choice trust game by Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004), which is one of the key features 
of our study, because it eliminates the positive direct effect of trustworthiness beliefs on trust, 
which has been outlined above, and allows an undistorted view of the hypothesized moderator 
effect of trustworthiness expectations. This is followed by Section 3, where we develop our 
hypotheses. Section 4 outlines our experimental design and the respective procedures. In Sec-
tion 5, we present our results and interpret them with respect to our hypotheses. Section 6 
concludes. 
2 Minimum Acceptable Probability Design 
The Minimum Acceptable probability design by Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004) is based on a 
binary-choice trust game (Camerer & Weigelt, 1988; Kreps, 1990). As depicted in Figure 2, the 
binary-choice trust game has three possible outcomes. If the trustor is not willing to trust (“no 
trust” alternative), both the trustor and the trustee earn a sure payoff, which we assume to be 
10 points for each of them. If the trustor is willing to trust (“trust” alternative), her or his 
payoff is determined by the trustee. The trustee has to decide whether to reward (“reward” 
  
138 
 
option) or to betray (“betrayal” option) the trustor. In the case of reward, the trustor and the 
trustee each receive the same payoff (15 points), which is higher than the first outcome. In the 
case of betrayal, the trustor’s payoff (8 points) is smaller than the sure payoff in the case of 
not trusting. The trustee’s payoff is higher (22 points) in comparison to both the case of not 
trusting and the case of rewarding. 
>>> Insert Figure 2 about here <<< 
In the particular framework of Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004), trustors have to state the 
probability at which they are indifferent between trusting and receiving the sure payoff, i.e. 
their minimum acceptable probability (MAP). The MAP represents trustors’ switching point 
beyond which they are willing to take a risk by trusting rather than receiving the sure outcome 
by not trusting. An MAP below or equal to the proportion of trustees who reward trust, i.e. 
the actual reward probability (rpa), indicates that trustors are willing to trust (MAP ≤ rpa), 
whereas an MAP above that proportion indicates the contrary (MAP > rpa). Consequently, 
the higher a trustor’s MAP, the less she or he is willing to trust. Trustors are informed about 
the actual reward probability only after they have reported their MAP. 
The MAP design offers the important advantage that trustors’ willingness to trust, meas-
ured in terms of their MAPs, should not be directly affected by their trustworthiness expecta-
tions (Bohnet, Greig, Herrmann, & Zeckhauser, 2008; Bohnet, Herrmann, & Zeckhauser, 2010). 
To explain this crucial aspect in a more rigorous way, we take a closer look at the trustors’ 
decision problem. Assume Uno trust to be the utility derived from choosing the safe outcome and 
let Ureward > Uno trust as well as Ubetrayal < Uno trust denote the utility if a trustor’s trust is 
rewarded or betrayed, respectively. Thus, rational trustors have to balance the sure utility 
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derived from not trusting (Uno trust) and the expected utility from trusting by choosing their 
MAPs according to the following equation: 
Uno trust = MAP · Ureward + (1 – MAP) · Ubetrayal. (4) 
Setting an MAP+ below MAP according to (4), one would accept reward probabilities 
which lead to expected utilities below the utility of the sure outcome (Uno trust). The contrary 
is true for MAP+ > MAP. In this case, one would forgo reward probabilities that generate 
beneficial expected utilities compared to Uno trust. Since a trustor’s MAP represents her or his 
minimum acceptable reward probability, the MAP should be independent of any considerations 
about the actual reward probability, i.e. her or his expected reward probability rpe. 
3 Hypotheses 
Decision making based on expected utilities requires that decision makers know the probabili-
ties of the options at hand and the utilities which they can derive from choosing these options 
(see, e.g., (1) for the expected utility of trusting in the binary-choice trust game). Economists 
as well as psychologists typically assume that expected utility incorporates anticipated emo-
tions (e.g. Loewenstein, 2000). In the context of trust, this assumption implies that trustors 
take into account the emotions associated with trust being rewarded or trust being betrayed 
when evaluating the expected utility of trusting. More formally speaking, anticipated emotions 
determine the size of ∆Ureward and ∆Ubetrayal connected with social preferences. 
Psychological research suggests that people’s abilities to anticipate future emotions 
(arousal) depend on their current emotional state, which is used as an anchor for prediction. 
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As a consequence, people in a state of low arousal (cold state) have difficulty predicting future 
emotions, i.e. what it would be like to be in a state of high arousal (hot state). This phenomenon 
has become known as the “hot-cold empathy gap” in the psychological literature (e.g. Van 
Boven & Loewenstein, 2005). Galak and Meyvis (2011) extend this literature by suggesting 
that the hot-cold empathy gap is related to expectations. More specifically, they argue that 
people who expect to return to an aversive experience feel higher arousal with respect to this 
experience. Transferred to the trust game, this line of reasoning implies that people’s trustwor-
thiness expectations activate a hot state either with respect to the experience of trust being 
rewarded or to the experience of trust being betrayed. If people expect their trust to be re-
warded, they enter a hot state with respect to the experience of trust being rewarded. The 
contrary effect takes place if people hold pessimistic trustworthiness expectations. In conse-
quence, optimistic subjects have a tendency to overweight positive emotions, whereas pessimis-
tic trustors place more emphasis on negative emotions. 
In formal terms, this implies that the MAP is an implicit function of ∆Ureward > 0 and 
of ∆Ubetrayal < 0, which, in turn, positively depend on rpe, i.e. ∂∆Ureward/∂rpe > 0 and 
∂∆Ubetrayal/∂rpe > 0. Summarizing, we have 
∆Utrust(rpe) = MAP ∙ ∆Ureward(rpe) + (1 – MAP) ∙ ∆Ubetrayal(rpe). (5) 
We can explore the indirect relationship between the MAP and rpe by considering the 
partial derivatives, which can be inferred from (5) by means of the implicit function theorem: 
MAP
∆Ureward  = 
MAP
∆Ureward  ∆Ubetrayal  < 0  and (6)
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MAP
∆Ubetrayal  = 
1  MAP
∆Ureward  ∆Ubetrayal  < 0. 
(7)
From (6), (7), ∂∆Ureward/∂rpe > 0 and ∂∆Ubetrayal/∂rpe > 0, we may conclude that 
∂MAP/∂rpe < 0. Thus, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H1: Optimistic trustworthiness expectations support a positive intrapersonal relationship be-
tween trust and trustworthiness, whereas the contrary holds for pessimistic trustworthi-
ness expectations. 
Note that the hypothesized moderator effect of trustworthiness expectations is presuma-
bly a distinctive feature of the intrapersonal relationship between trust and trustworthiness, 
which does not necessarily apply to other types of social behavior. Altruists, for instance, do 
not necessarily attach negative emotions to trust being betrayed, because altruism is uncondi-
tional. In contrast to trustworthiness it does not describe a reaction to a certain behavior of 
another person. Therefore, it is not even clear that we have ∆Ubetrayal < 0 and thus 
∆Ureward – ∆Ubetrayal > 0 in the case of purely altruistic trustors. Moreover, there is no reason 
to assume that ∆Ureward and ∆Ubetrayal are functions of rpe for purely altruistic preferences. As 
a consequence, trustworthiness expectations do not necessarily moderate the relationship be-
tween trust and altruism in the way described by (6). This is also why our study differs signif-
icantly from that of Breuer et al. (2017), who investigate the intrapersonal relationship between 
trust and social value orientation. 
In order to test H1, we conduct a repeated trust game in which subjects act as trustors 
and subsequently as trustees (or the other way round). Given that the hot-cold empathy gap 
operates in the way proposed in H1, we expect that in a repeated trust game subjects will tend 
  
142 
 
to feel higher arousal in the second round than in the first round, irrespective of their trust-
worthiness expectations and thus irrespective of the direction of their arousal. Therefore, we 
expect trustors to be more prone to elevated estimations of ΔUreward and ∆Ubetrayal when mak-
ing their “second round” decisions. Our second hypothesis reflects this difference between 
rounds: 
H2: The moderator effect of trustworthiness expectations proposed in H1 is larger for “second 
round” trustors than for “first round” trustors. 
4 Experimental Design and Procedures 
Our experiment took place in the laboratory of a large German university, using z-Tree (Fisch-
bacher, 2007). Participants were invited via ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). We conducted four iden-
tical sessions with 28 to 30 participants (N = 116). Each session lasted about 45 minutes. Upon 
arrival, participants were randomly assigned to a computer. Once all participants were seated, 
they were informed that they could earn cash depending on their decisions and the decisions 
made by other participants, that the experiment was held anonymously, and that they would 
be paid privately at the end of the experiment. The experiment itself consisted of two inde-
pendent parts and a socio-demographic questionnaire. First, subjects played two rounds of the 
binary-choice trust game developed by Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004). Second, subjects’ risk 
preferences were elicited by means of the multiple price-list method of Holt and Laury (2002). 
Both parts were monetarily incentivized. 
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Given the relatively high complexity of the binary-choice trust game, the experiment was 
designed with a strong focus on subjects’ comprehension. At the beginning of the trust game 
part, subjects were provided with written instructions which they might use during the whole 
experiment. The experimental supervisor, being the same person in all sessions, read the in-
structions aloud and answered subjects’ questions individually. Moreover, subjects were given 
plenty of time to study the instructions on their own. To ensure further that participants 
understood the MAP framework well, they had to pass a comprehension task in the style of 
Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004). To be more precise, subjects had to calculate individual payoffs 
for trustors and trustees based on hypothetical MAPs and reward probabilities. Having an-
swered all questions correctly, the first round of the binary-choice trust game began. Subjects 
were randomly assigned either to the trustor or to the trustee role. Participants who acted as 
trustors in the first round were assigned to the trustee role in the second round, and vice versa. 
The reversal of roles was only announced after the first round. Furthermore, subjects were 
informed that they would be newly paired in the next round. In this vein, we intended to 
reduce interdependencies between rounds from the participants’ perspective. 
The procedure of the two rounds of the binary-choice trust game was as follows. After 
the random assignment of roles, trustors reported the probability at which they would prefer 
to trust rather than to receive the sure payoff, i.e. their minimum acceptable probability (MAP). 
Then, trustors had to estimate the actual rate of reward (rpe). The estimation task was incen-
tivized by means of a quadratic scoring rule, which is still a common method to incentivize the 
elicitation of probability beliefs (see, e.g., Gotthard-Real, 2017; Qiu & Weitzel, 2016). However, 
the quadratic scoring rule has been subject to criticism, because the revealed beliefs may be 
biased due to risk aversion. As we only moderately incentivized the estimation task (a fully 
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correct estimation yielded 1.00 Euros), we do not believe that risk aversion diminishes the 
validity of the elicited beliefs. Nevertheless, we explicitly address this issue in our regression 
analyses by controlling for subjects’ risk aversion. 
While trustors stated their MAPs and their estimations of rpe, trustees had to choose 
whether to reward or to betray in the case of being trusted (strategy method). Options were 
neutrally labeled. Having made their decisions, trustors and trustees were randomly paired, 
and payoffs were calculated. The payoff structure is depicted in Figure 2. One point was equal 
to 0.50 Euros. An MAP below or equal to the actual reward probability rpa indicated that a 
trustor was willing to trust, whereas MAP > rpa indicated the contrary. Note that subjects 
were not informed about the payoffs from either round until the very end of the experiment. 
In the second part of the experiment, subjects’ risk aversion was elicited by means of the 
multiple price list method of Holt and Laury (2002). The multiple price list typically contains 
ten rows, each representing a choice between a “sure” and a “risky” gamble. After subjects had 
completed the multiple price list, one of their ten decisions was picked at random for remuner-
ation. Subjects were informed about this procedure in advance. The result of the random draw 
was disclosed to participants only at the very end of the experiment. 
5 Results 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Across all four sessions conducted, 116 subjects took part in our experiment (45 females and 
68 males). We exclude three of them (two females and one male) from further consideration, 
because they had great difficulty completing the comprehension test, which took place at the 
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beginning of the experiment. Among the remaining 113 subjects, trustors’ mean MAP was 
59.3 % (SD = 0.255). “Second round” trustors stated lower MAPs (M = 0.542, SD = 0.291) 
than “first round” trustors did (M = 0.645, SD = 0.201). According to a Mann-Whitney test, 
the difference is not statistically significant (Z = -1.572, p = 0.116). The overall actual reward 
probability rpa, computed across all sessions, was 43.4 %. The corresponding statistics are 
depicted in Table 1. 
>>> Insert Table 1 about here <<< 
According to the estimation task, trustors expected on average 48.8 % (SD = 0.255) of 
the trustees to be willing to reward trust. Thus, trustors only slightly overestimated the actual 
reward probability (rpa = 43.4 %). Referring to their trustworthiness expectations, “second 
round” trustors were slightly more optimistic (M = 50.7 %, SD = 0.245) than “first round” 
trustors were (M = 47.0 %, SD = 0.264). However, a Mann-Whitney test does not indicate a 
statistically significant difference (Z = -0.728, p = 0.469). The corresponding statistics are de-
picted in Table 2. 
>>> Insert Table 2 about here <<< 
5.2 Hypotheses Testing 
In the following, we examine the interplay between trust, trustworthiness, and trustworthiness 
expectations. We measure subjects’ trustworthiness by whether they chose to reward as trus-
tees (variable: Reward). Trustors’ trustworthiness expectations are derived from the estimation 
task (variable: Trustworthiness Expectations, identical to rpe). Higher values of Trustworthi-
ness Expectations refer to higher levels of optimism. Trust is measured in terms of the MAP 
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stated in the trustor role (variable: MAP). A higher MAP implies a lower willingness to trust, 
and vice versa. Since the MAP is a fraction, we base our entire analysis on generalized linear 
models (GLMs) with logistic link functions (Papke & Wooldridge, 1996). However, we obtain 
quite similar results by using OLS regressions rather than GLMs. The respective regressions 
can be found in the Appendix. We ensure that multicollinearity is not an issue in all our 
models. 
To gain first insights, we study the unconditional relationship between the MAP and 
Reward within subjects (Model 1 in Table 3). Model 1 includes our two main variables of in-
terest, Reward and Trustworthiness Expectations, and a dummy variable for whether trustors 
acted as “first round” trustors or “second round” trustors (variable: First Round). Moreover, we 
control for subjects’ gender. Model 1 reveals a negative relationship between MAP and Reward 
(i.e. a positive relationship between trust and trustworthiness), which confirms previous re-
search (e.g. Altmann et al., 2008). The variable Gender is not significant. It is important to 
note that the negative effect of Reward does not necessarily conflict with H1, although H1 
predicts a positive effect of Reward on the MAP for pessimistic trustworthiness expectations. 
The underlying reason for the negative effect of Reward may be that our subject sample is 
dominated by subjects being prone to a consensus effect (Mullen et al., 1985; Ross et al., 1977), 
which induces a positive correlation between Reward and Trustworthiness Expectations and 
thus a negative correlation between Reward and the MAP due to the hot-cold empathy gap. 
By implication, there may be relatively few subjects who themselves are trustworthy (untrust-
worthy) but pessimistic (optimistic) concerning the trustworthiness of others. Our data pro-
vides support for the prevalence of a consensus effect. Among the trustworthy subjects, a 
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majority (77.6 %) expected the reward probability to be higher than 0.5 (optimistic trustwor-
thiness expectations). A similar pattern applies to the untrustworthy subjects: 70.3 % of them 
expected the reward probability to be equal to 0.5 or smaller (pessimistic trustworthiness ex-
pectations). 
A second result that can be directly derived from Model 1 is that “second round” trustors 
exhibit significantly higher levels of trust than “first round” trustors do (positive effect of First 
Round on the MAP). This finding points to another facet of the hot-cold empathy gap, because 
acting as a “second round” trustor certainly fosters people’s perspective-taking abilities. If “sec-
ond round” trustors identify more with trustees than “first round” trustors do, it is natural to 
assume that the former tend to state lower MAPs. 
>>> Insert Table 3 about here <<< 
In the second step of our analysis, we extend the basic model by including the interaction 
between Reward and Trustworthiness Expectations (Model 2). The interaction term Re-
ward  Trustworthiness Expectations is statistically significant. Moreover, the conditional ef-
fect of Reward on the MAP turns out to be significantly positive, which indicates a negative 
relationship between trust and trustworthiness for extreme pessimism. For extreme optimism, 
however, the effect of Reward becomes negative. We examine the interaction between Reward 
and Trustworthiness Expectations more closely by means of the predicted mean MAPs, which 
are depicted for several levels of Trustworthiness Expectations in Figure 3. All variables other 
than MAP, Reward, and Trustworthiness Expectations are assumed to be at their mean. As 
the substantial difference of the slopes illustrates, Reward and Trustworthiness Expectations 
interact in the hypothesized way: Optimistic trustworthiness expectations are associated with 
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a positive intrapersonal correlation between trust and trustworthiness, whereas the contrary 
holds for pessimistic trustworthiness expectations. 
In the third step, we examine whether the interaction between Reward and Trustworthi-
ness Expectations differs between “first round” trustors and “second round” trustors. For this 
purpose, we split our sample with respect to the variable First Round and re-conduct Model 2 
for each subsample. In this manner, we obtain two separate models for “first round” trustors 
(Model 3) and “second round” trustors (Model 4). The regression results show that the inter-
action effect is significant for “second round” trustors only. The coefficients of the interaction 
term differ significantly between “first round” trustors and “second round” trustors 
(χ2 = 8.32, p < 0.05). 
To complete our analysis, we repeat the previous steps by including subjects’ risk aver-
sion as an additional control variable in the respective regressions. In the context of trust, 
several studies have pointed to the role of risk aversion, suggesting that risk averse individuals 
are less willing to trust than risk neutral or risk loving ones, because putting trust in another 
person implies taking the risk of being betrayed (see Trautmann & Vieider, 2012 for an over-
view). The variable Risk Aversion refers to the number of “safe” options chosen in the multiple 
price list section of the experiment (Holt & Laury, 2002). Controlling for risk aversion requires 
excluding three subjects holding inconsistent risk preferences from further analysis. The re-
spective results, which can be found in Table 4, confirm our previous findings. First, Reward 
and Trust are positively correlated (Model 1 in Table 4). Note that the effect of First Round 
is not statistically significant when using OLS regressions rather than GLMs (see Model 1 in 
Table A.2 in the Appendix). Second, Reward interacts with Trustworthiness Expectations in 
the way hypothesized in H1. Third, the interaction effect is more pronounced for “second round” 
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trustors than for “first round” trustors (χ2 = 10.23, p < 0.01). In all four models, Risk Aversion 
has a positive impact on the MAP, i.e. a negative impact on trust. However, the effects lack 
statistical significance. In this aspect, our findings correspond to earlier studies (e.g. Eckel & 
Wilson, 2004). Last but not least, gender does not play a significant role in any of the models. 
>>> Insert Table 4 about here <<< 
6 Conclusion 
In the present study, we shed new light on the intrapersonal interdependencies between trust, 
trustworthiness, and trustworthiness expectations. Our findings underline that the relationship 
between trust and trustworthiness is non-trivial and that emotional perspective taking plays a 
key role in this context. In line with previous studies, we find that subjects’ willingness to trust 
as a trustor is positively correlated with their willingness to reciprocate in the trustee role. 
However, this correlation is moderated by participants’ trustworthiness expectations. If sub-
jects hold optimistic expectations, their willingness to trust is positively related to their will-
ingness to reward. The contrary relationship is true for pessimistic subjects. We argue that 
from an individual perspective the expected utility of trusting depends on the emotions which 
people expect to experience when being rewarded or betrayed. Optimistic subjects have a ten-
dency to overweight positive emotions, whereas pessimistic trustors place more emphasis on 
negative emotions. As a consequence, the moderator effect of trustworthiness expectations oc-
curs. 
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A better understanding of how trust and trustworthiness are related within individuals 
is highly important for practitioners, because outside the laboratory the roles of trustors and 
trustees typically overlap: A person who has to choose whether to place trust in somebody else 
on one day may be the trusted party on the other day. Especially policy makers might want 
to know how measures taken to support trust affect trustworthiness, and the other way round. 
In line with the proverb “Once bitten, twice shy”, a person who has been a victim of betrayal 
once does not only expect the risk of future betrayal to be higher than others do, but also the 
pain accompanying this experience to be more intense. In this aspect, our findings provide 
additional evidence for the intuition that extremely negative or positive expectations increase 
the amplitude of macroeconomic cycles: Pessimism intensifies crises by reducing trustworthy 
market participants’ willingness to trust, whereas optimism fosters booms by promoting a 
positive relationship between trust and trustworthiness. This is also why promoting trust and 
trustworthiness is more costly in times when pessimistic expectations dominate. 
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Tables 
 Minimum Acceptable Probabilities (MAPs) 
 Overall First Round Second Round 
Mean 0.593 0.645 0.542 
Standard Deviation 0.255 0.201 0.291 
N 113 56 57 
Table 1: Minimum acceptable probabilities stated in the binary-choice trust game 
 Trustworthiness Expectations (rpe) 
 Overall First Round Second Round 
Mean 0.488 0.470 0.507 
Standard Deviation 0.255 0.264 0.245 
N 113 56 57 
Table 2: Trustworthiness expectations stated in the estimation task 
  
  
155 
 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable MAP MAP MAP MAP 
Reward (1 = Yes) -0.296*** 0.852* 0.016 1.698** 
 (0.050) (0.452) (0.446) (0.715) 
Trustworthiness Expectations 0.200 0.762*** 0.118 1.202*** 
 (0.255) (0.163) (0.107) (0.245) 
Reward  Trustworthiness Expectations  -2.055*** -0.494 -3.551***
  (0.734) (0.792) (1.088) 
First Round (1 = Yes) 0.436** 0.485**   
 (0.219) (0.208)   
Gender -0.151 -0.167 0.167 -0.552 
 (0.328) (0.303) (0.297) (0.404) 
Constant 0.287 0.063 0.604*** 0.147 
(0.423) (0.388) (0.147) (0.543) 
Observations 113 113 56 57 
Generalized linear models with logistic link function 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered for experimental sessions 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Table 3: Determinants of the MAP (without Risk Aversion) 
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Model (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable MAP MAP MAP MAP 
Reward (1 = Yes) -0.360*** 1.052** 0.159 1.798* 
 (0.137) (0.489) (0.382) (0.982) 
Trustworthiness Expectations 0.215 0.917*** 0.074 1.482*** 
 (0.168) (0.207) (0.163) (0.331) 
Reward  Trustworthiness Expectations  -2.558*** -0.787* -3.981** 
  (0.826) (0.457) (1.609) 
First Round (1 = Yes) 0.447* 0.510**   
 (0.235) (0.223)   
Gender -0.110 -0.114 0.168 -0.520 
 (0.288) (0.258) (0.290) (0.489) 
Risk Aversion 0.077 0.104 0.119 0.033 
 (0.089) (0.086) (0.107) (0.173) 
Constant -0.178 -0.614 -0.059 -0.137 
(0.551) (0.485) (0.646) (1.586) 
Observations 110 110 56 54 
Generalized linear models with logistic link function 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered for experimental sessions 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Table 4: Determinants of the MAP (including Risk Aversion)
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Figures 
 
Figure 1: Moderator effect and mediator effect of Trustworthiness Expectations 
 
Figure 2: Binary-choice trust game  
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Figure 3: Interaction between Reward and Trustworthiness Expectations  
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Appendix 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable MAP MAP MAP MAP 
Reward (1 = Yes) -0.296*** 0.852* 0.016 1.698** 
 (0.050) (0.452) (0.446) (0.715) 
Trustworthiness Expectations 0.200 0.762*** 0.118 1.202*** 
 (0.255) (0.163) (0.107) (0.245) 
Reward  Trustworthiness Expectations  -2.055*** -0.494 -3.551***
  (0.734) (0.792) (1.088) 
First Round (1 = Yes) 0.436** 0.485**   
 (0.219) (0.208)   
Gender -0.151 -0.167 0.167 -0.552 
 (0.328) (0.303) (0.297) (0.404) 
Constant 0.287 0.063 0.604*** 0.147 
(0.423) (0.388) (0.147) (0.543) 
Observations 113 113 56 57 
Adjusted R-squared 0.027 0.052 -0.045 0.065 
OLS regressions 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered for experimental sessions 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Table A.1: Determinants of the MAP (without Risk Aversion)  
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Model (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable MAP MAP MAP MAP 
Reward (1 = Yes) -0.086* 0.242 0.036 0.420 
 (0.035) (0.111) (0.087) (0.237) 
Trustworthiness Expectations 0.052 0.208** 0.018 0.351** 
 (0.040) (0.043) (0.039) (0.093) 
Reward  Trustworthiness Expectations  -0.591* -0.177 -0.935* 
  (0.188) (0.105) (0.397) 
First Round (1 = Yes) 0.106 0.119   
 (0.060) (0.056)   
Gender -0.026 -0.027 0.038 -0.122 
 (0.069) (0.061) (0.068) (0.118) 
Risk Aversion 0.018 0.024 0.027 0.008 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.026) (0.043) 
Constant 0.460** 0.363* 0.492* 0.463 
(0.135) (0.121) (0.161) (0.393) 
Observations 110 110 56 54 
Adjusted R-squared 0.036 0.079 0.003 0.077 
OLS regressions 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered for experimental sessions 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Table A.2: Determinants of the MAP (including Risk Aversion) 
